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Defending the Citadel: The
Dangerous Attack of "Reasonable
Good Faith"
Stanley Ingber*t
During the last half century the proper scope of the fourth
amendment1 and its related exclusionary rule has provoked heated
discussion among jurists' and scholars. 3 The Supreme Court has
interpreted the amendment as providing constitutional recognition
of the individual's right to privacy.4 The amendment, therefore,
* Professor of Law, University of Florida, Holland Law Center. B.A., 1969, Brooklyn
College; J.D., 1972, Yale University.
t My appreciation to Penelope Ingber, my wife, for her immeasurable help in writing
this Article.
1. The fourth amendment guarantees,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. For a sampling of this debate in recent cases, see United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct.
2637 (1983); Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983); Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319
(1983); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981);
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980);
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
3. See, e.g., Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MIN. L. REV.
349 (1974); Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the "Legitimate Expectation of Pri-
vacy," 34 VAND. L. REv. 1289 (1981); Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health?
Some New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681 (1974);
Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an "Illogical" or "Unnatural" Interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment?, 62 JuDicATuta 66 (1978); Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary
Rule, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1027 (1974); LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect
World: On Drawing "Bright Lines" and "Good Faith," 43 U. Prrr. L. REv. 307 (1982);
McMillian, Is there Anything Left of the Fourth Amendment?, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1 (1979);
Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulat-
ing the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEo. L.J. 365 (1981); Miles, Decline of the Fourth
Amendment: Time to Overrule Mapp v. Ohio?, 27 CATH. U.L. REv. 9 (1977); Oaks, Studying
the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 665 (1970); Schlesinger,
The Exclusionary Rule: Have Proponents Proven That it is a Deterrent to Police?, 62 JUmi-
CATURE 404 (1979); Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 Ju-
DiCATURE 214 (1978).




protects the individual from unwarranted governmental intrusion
upon his person and domain. This protection is essential to the
maintenance of the proper balance between the life of a person as
an individual and his life as a member of society." Accordingly, po-
lice normally must have probable cause, and often a search war-
rant, before they lawfully can invade an individual's privacy to
search for or seize evidence.6 Few scholars question the value of so
protecting individual privacy. In contrast, however, the wisdom of
using the exclusionary rule as a procedural remedy for governmen-
tal violations of fourth amendment guarantees has been a topic of
extensive debate.
Under the exclusionary rule courts must exclude at trial any
evidence seized during searches made in violation of fourth amend-
ment standards. Since its earliest pronouncement,8 critics have
condemned this procedure that keeps relevant and reliable evi-
dence from the trial fact-finder. Justice (then Judge) Cardozo, for
example, described the rule as a mechanism permitting "[t]he
criminal. . . to go free because the constable has blundered."'
More recently the exclusionary rule's detractors have mar-
shalled their forces to reduce the rule's impact by carving out a
good faith exception. The exception provides for admission of ifle-
gally obtained evidence if the offending officer acted with the rea-
sonable good faith belief that his conduct conformed to the fourth
amendment. In their frustration with the exclusionary rule a num-
5. T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 74 (1966). Jus-
tice Felix Frankfurter recognized that the fourth amendment held "a place second to none
in the Bill of Rights." Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 157 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). Even the first amendment cannot claim greater importance because "speech
activity is [but] a small albeit precious part of the lives of most citizens, and even its fullest
protection leaves the police unfettered to deal as they please with most of us most of the
time." Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 377-78.
6. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 356-58 (1967); United States v. Ventresca,
380 U.S. 102 (1965); cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). In some situations
the search may be sufficiently limited as not to require probable cause. E.g., Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968). Exigencies also may prevent an officer from obtaining a warrant. E.g.,
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
7. This statement is somewhat too broad. As discussed in part I, see infra text accom-
panying notes 38-42, illegally obtained evidence is admissible in certain types and stages of
various proceedings. But, as a general proposition, courts must exclude illegally seized
evidence.
8. The Supreme Court first articulated the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), but imposed the rule only upon federal courts. Nearly fifty years
passed before the Court extended the rule's application to encompass state courts as well.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
9. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
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ber of courts,'0 jurists," state legislatures,' 2 legal associations,"
and scholars 14 have adopted or supported some form of this good
faith exception.'5
Given this climate, the good faith exception unsurprisingly has
gained the attention of the Supreme Court. Four, or perhaps even
five, of the Justices publicly have acknowledged their unease with
the exclusionary rule's effect and their sympathy with suggested
reforms."' At the Court's request, the attorneys in Illinois v.
Gates17 briefed and argued the issue of a good faith exception dur-
ing the October 1982 term. The Court, however, sidestepped the
issue by deciding the case on other grounds.'8 Nevertheless, within
10. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals specifically has recognized a good faith excep-
tion. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 846-47 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1127 (1981). Since the new Eleventh Circuit was carved out of the old Fifth Circuit,
Williams likely is binding in the Eleventh Circuit as well.
11. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, _ 441 N.E.2d 725, 733-
34 (1982) (Wilkins, J.), cert. granted sub noma. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 103 S. Ct. 3534
(1983).
12. At least two states have adopted by legislation some form of a good faith excep-
tion. See Axuz. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3925 (1982); COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-3-308 (1982).
13. The prestigious American Law Institute has recommended the exclusion of evi-
dence only in those cases in which the police violation was "substantial." In determining
whether the violation, indeed, was substantial a court should consider all the circumstances,
including the willfulness of the violation. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE §
SS 290.2(2), (4) (Official Draft 1975).
14. See, e.g., Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The "Reasonable" Excep-
tion to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. Crm. L. & CmIMNOLOGY 635 (1978); Bernardi, The
Exclusionary Rule: Is a Good Faith Standard Needed to Preserve a Liberal Interpretation
of the Fourth Amendment2, 30 DE PAUL L. REv. 51 (1980); Sunderland, The Exclusionary
Rule: A Requirement of Constitutional Principle, 69 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 141 (1978).
15. In its final report Attorney General William French Smith's bipartisan Task Force
on Violent Crime urged the Attorney General to support a good faith exception through
court argument and legislative recommendation. ATTORNEY GENERAL's TASK FORCE ON VIO-
LENT CRIME, FINAL REP. 55 (Aug. 17, 1981).
16. Four Justices have authored opinions supporting some form of a good faith excep-
tion. See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2340-47 (1983) (White, J., concurring); Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 501 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590,
611-12 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542
(1975) (Rehnquist, J.). Furthermore, Justice O'Connor, at her nomination hearings before
the Senate Judiciary Committee, testified about her belief that courts do not have to ex-
clude illegally obtained evidence under the fourth amendment if the court takes into ac-
count the good faith of police. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Nomi-
nation of Sandra Day O'Connor, 97th Cong., 1st Seas. 79-80 (1981) (unbound transcripts on
file in Senate Document Room).
17. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
18. In Gates the Court reversed the Illinois court's ruling suppressing evidence ob-
tained under a warrant supported predominately by an anonymous tip. Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, found sufficient police corroboration of the tipster's information to
justify the magistrate's finding of probable cause. The Justice apologized for the Court's
avoidance of the good faith argument, but claimed such avoidance appropriate upon a re-
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three weeks of the Gates decision the Court accepted for argument
during the October 1983 term three cases concerning good faith
claims.19 Obviously, the Justices have signaled their readiness to
enter the fray.
Opponents of the good faith exception, therefore, now must
voice their arguments. This Article presents arguments that are
designed to influence the Court's deliberations, to create a basis for
critiquing the Court's opinions once rendered, and to provide guid-
ance for state courts, which soon may need to decide whether a
good faith exception is consistent with their state constitutions and
procedures. 20 To place the subsequent discussion in context, part I
cord which showed the prosecution never had raised or addressed the question before the
state tribunals and that none of the Illinois courts had considered the question. Id. at 2323.
Justice White, concurring separately, chastised the Court for avoiding the issue under a
totally unconvincing rationale. Noting that the Supreme Court's pronouncements bound the
Illinois courts regarding the federal exclusionary rule, he found requiring a litigant to re-
quest a state court to overrule or modify a United States Supreme Court precedent point-
less. Id. at 2338 (White, J., concurring). Such a practice would undercut stare decisis. "Ei-
ther the presentation of such issues to the lower courts will be a completely futile gesture or
the lower courts are now invited to depart from this Court's decisions whenever they con-
clude such a modification is in order." Id.
19. The United States Law Week noted the cases and described their good faith is-
sues as follows:
(1) Colorado v. Quintero, - Colo. -, 657 P.2d 948, cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3535
(1983). "Did Colorado Supreme Court mistakenly interpret Fourth Amendment's prohibi-
tion against unreasonable search and seizure when it applied exclusionary rule to undis-
puted good-faith seizure of stolen property?" 51 U.S.L.W. 3914 (June 28, 1983).
(2) United States v. Leon, No. 82-1093 (9th Cir. Jan. 19, 1983), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct.
3535 (1983). "Should Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule be modified so as not to bar
admission of evidence seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on search warrant that is
subsequently held to be defective?" 51 U.S.L.W. 3914 (June 28, 1983).
(3) Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d 725 (1982), cert. granted
sub noma. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 103 S. Ct. 3534 (1983). "Does Fourth Amendment
require inflexible application of exclusionary rule when police officer has reasonably and in
good faith relied upon search warrant to seize items specified in his application for warrant,
but warrant is subsequently invalidated for magistrate's error in failing to specify items in
warrant itself?" 51 U.S.L.W. 3913 (June 28, 1983).
Subsequent to the writing of this Article, on December 12, 1983, the Court dismissed
the writ of certiorari in Quintero. 52 U.S.L.W. 3460 (Dec. 13, 1983). The Court explained
that "it appear[ed] that respondent died on November 27, 1983." Id. Ironically, Quintero
could have been the most significant of the three cases since it involved the only search by
an officer not acting pursuant to any warrant.
20. Assuming the Supreme Court approves a good faith exception to the federal exclu-
sionary rule, state courts, consistent with the United States Constitution, may interpret
their state constitutional provisions as granting broader protections than federal law man-
dates. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L.
REv. 489, 502 (1977). See, e.g., People v. Sporleder, - Colo. - , 666 P.2d 135 (1983)
(warrantless use of a pen register violates the Colorado Constitution even if it is consistent
with the federal Constitution under Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)); State v. Al-
ston, 88 N.J. 211, 440 A.2d 1311 (1981) (New Jersey retains defendant's automatic standing
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of the Article briefly sketches the historical development of the ex-
clusionary rule. Part II develops the general arguments against the
exclusionary rule and the specific arguments in favor of a good
faith exception. Part III exposes the conceptual flaws of the excep-
tion by demonstrating its inconsistency with a constitutional con-
cept of right, its disastrous effect on the substance of the fourth
amendment, and its interference with a defendant's right to effec-
tive counsel. The Article considers practical problems associated
with implementation of such an exception in part IV. Finally the
Article, in its entirety, demonstrates the hidden agenda behind the
movement supporting the good faith exception: minimizing the
fourth amendment's significance and substantive protection.
I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
An understanding of the arguments for and against a good
faith exception requires some basic familiarity with the evolution
of the exclusionary rule and its traditional justifications. In 1914
the Supreme Court decided Weeks v. United States,2 1 which pro-
hibited the use in federal courts of evidence obtained in violation
of the fourth amendment. The Court stated in defense of this
position:
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain
conviction by means of unlawful seizures... should find no sanction in the
judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support of
the Constitution and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal
for the maintenance of such fundamental rights.22
The Court's concern in Weeks, therefore, was not nearly as
much with preventing illegal seizures by law enforcement officers
as it was both with preventing courts from becoming accomplices
in this illegal conduct2 3 and with dissipating any impression of ju-
dicial imprimatur.24 The Court viewed exclusion of illegally ob-
to invoke the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases in spite of federal court decisions
such as Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978)); People v. Bustamante, 30 Cal. 3d 88, 634
P.2d 927, 177 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1981) (California suspects have a right to counsel at pre-
indictment lineups even if federal suspects have no comparable right under Kirby v. Illinois,
406 U.S. 682 (1972)). A recent amendment to the Florida Constitution, however, forbids
Florida courts from excluding evidence in those circumstances when similarly obtained evi-
dence would be admissible in federal courts. FLA. CONsT. art. 1, § 12.
21. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
22. Id. at 392.
23. The Court used precisely this language in the much more recent case of Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960).
24. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968). William Mertens and Silas Wasserstom
identify four normative principles underlying the Weeks exclusionary rule: first, convicting a
1983] 1515
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tained evidence as necessary to fulfill its responsibility under the
fourth amendment. Thus, the Court considered the substantive
scope of the fourth amendment and the procedural remedy of the
exclusionary rule inseparably intertwined.
Thirty-five years passed before the Court suggested the exclu-
sionary rule was not essential to enforcement of fourth amendment
guarantees. In Wolf v. Colorado2 5 the Court allowed the admission
in state criminal proceedings of evidence that would have been
inadmissible in federal proceedings under the exclusionary rule. In
so doing, however, the Supreme Court did recognize that the
fourth amendment limitations on governmental searches and
seizures bound the states, 2e but refused to require exclusion of evi-
dence as a remedy for state violation of the amendment's stan-
dards. Consequently, the Court severed the exclusionary rule from
its mooring in the substantive amendment and severely restricted
the exclusionary rule's range and effect. Therefore, free to develop
their own remedies for fourth amendment violations, 7 the states
and their law enforcement agencies found the Court's fourth
amendment rhetoric unobjectionable. Justice Murphy in dissent,
however, impliedly recognized that acknowledgement of a right
without provision of a specific remedy for violation likely would
result in no right at all: "Alternatives are deceptive. Their very
statement conveys the impression that one possibility is as effec-
tive as the next. In this case their statement is blinding. For there
is but one alternative to the rule of exclusion. That is no sanction
at all.
''2s
Over time the wedge Wolf drove between the fourth amend-
ment and the exclusionary rule became unbearable to the Court.
defendant on the basis of unlawfully seized evidence is simply unfair; second, admission of
such evidence at trial constitutes an additional invasion of privacy; third, government is not
to be advantaged by the wrongdoing of its agents; and last, admission of unlawfully seized
evidence compromises the integrity of the courts. Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 3, at
377-78.
25. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
26. Id. at 27-28. Because the Bill of Rights as initially conceived applied only to the
federal government, Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Peters) 242, 246 (1833), from early
times the Court interpreted the fourth amendment as inapplicable to the states. See Smith
v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 Howard) 71, 76 (1855). With the advent of the post-Civil War
amendments, however, the Court gradually imposed the Bill of Rights upon the states by
incorporation into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Accordingly, Wolf
held that the security of one's privacy against arbitrary government intrusion was "implicit
in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the States through the
Due Process Clause" of the fourteenth amendment. 338 U.S. at 27-28.
27. See id. at 30-33.
28. Id. at 41 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 36:15111516
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Many states ignored the Court's plea for them to design and im-
plement remedies for fourth amendment violations. Twelve years
after Wolf, the Court's dissatisfaction with the states' general un-
responsiveness culminated in Mapp v. Ohio2 9 The Justices no
longer were willing to accept the existence of a right without an
effective remedy for its violation. All evidence obtained by state
officials in violation of the fourth amendment, therefore, became
inadmissible at trial.3 0
According to Mapp, the exclusionary rule was to perform two
functions: first, protection of judicial integrity by avoiding the ap-
pearance of impropriety created by permitting use of tainted evi-
dence;"1 and second, deterrence of illegal police searches by com-
pelling "respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only
effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard
it.'))3 Protecting judicial integrity was firmly grounded in exclu-
sionary rule history dating back almost fifty years to the Weeks
opinion. The purpose of deterring illegal police behavior, however,
was of more recent vintage. In fact, the deterrence language that
the Court approvingly quoted first had been set forth in a decision
that the Court had rendered just one year earlier.33
While the Mapp decision failed to indicate which of these
functions was weightier, later decisions clearly illustrate the
Court's view that police deterrence is the preeminent purpose of
the exclusionary rule." Although occasionally alluding to the "im-
29. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
30. Id. at 655.
31. Id. at 659; see Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-23 (1960).
32. 367 U.S. at 656.
33. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). Elkins marked the demise of
the so-called "silver platter" doctrine, whereby federal authorities could use in federal pros-
ecutions evidence unlawfully obtained by state police.
34. In Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), the Court refused to give retroactive
effect to Mapp's extension of the exclusionary rule to the states:
[A]ll of the cases... requiring the exclusion of illegal evidence have been based on the
necessity for an effective deterrent to illegal police action.... We cannot say that this
purpose would be advanced by making the rule retrospective. The misconduct of the
police... has already occurred and will not be corrected by releasing the prisoners
involved.
Id. at 636-37. In United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), the Court held illegally
obtained evidence admissible at grand jury proceedings under the theory that forbidding the
evidence's use at trial already achieved all possible deterrence. Id. at 349-52. But even as-
suming both Linkletter and Calandra were correct vis-a-vis deterrence, judicial integrity
surely was at stake in both cases. Evidently, the Court considered only police deterrence of
sufficient importance to mandate exclusion.
1983] 1517
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perative of judicial integrity,"3 the Court has stressed the limited
role this justification plays in determining whether the rule should
be applied in a particular case. 6 Thus, the exclusionary rule has
taken on an instrumental appearance, warranting application only
when its consequence is significantly to enhance deterrence of ille-
gal searches and seizures. From this perspective, before a decision
to exclude evidence is justifiable a court must answer the following
two questions: First, will the suppression of evidence in a specific
case enhance deterrence of illegal police behavior? Second, is the
deterrence sufficient to outweigh the damage to other goals of the
criminal justice system? The decisional process, hence, becomes
utilitarian: simply balancing costs against benefits.37
Accepting this utilitarian approach to exclusionary rule deci-
sions, the Court has refused to apply the rule to those situations in
which its deterrent effect would be minimal. Accordingly, prosecu-
tors may use illegally obtained evidence in grand jury proceed-
ings,38 in impeaching a criminal defendant's testimony at trial,3 9 in
civil proceedings brought by a different sovereign than the one
that actually seized the evidence, 40 and in the criminal trial of a
defendant who lacks standing to invoke the rule's protection be-
cause he was not the actual victim of the improper search.,1 Fur-
thermore, a state prisoner no longer may seek federal habeas
corpus relief on fourth amendment grounds if he had a "full and
fair opportunity" to litigate the issue at the state level because, at
least in the Supreme Court's view, the "additional incremental de-
terrent effect" of exclusion at the habeas stage is insignificant.' 2
35. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968).
36. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976). Some scholars now view deterrence
as essentially the "sole theory" behind the exclusionary rule. E.g., Wilkey, supra note 3, at
220.
37. Utilitarian decisional modes are arguably inappropriate when dealing with consti-
tutional rights rather than with societal gratuities. See infra text accompanying notes 103-
07.
38. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
39. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
40. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
41. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
42. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). This consequentialist perspective
has become so prevalent in the exclusionary rule context that some of the rule's opponents
claim it now influences judicial analysis of the fourth amendment's substantive rights. Pro-
fessor Steven Schlesinger, for example, insists that the exclusionary rule forces the judiciary
to expand dangerously the meaning of a legal search in order to avoid exclusion of evidence
the judges are reluctant to suppress. Schlesinger, supra note 3, at 405. Professor Schles-
inger's perspective may explain the courts' increasing number of refusals to suppress evi-
dence by claiming no, or only a limited, legitimate expectation of privacy existed. See
1518 [Vol. 36:1511
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The pervasive deterrent justification for the exclusionary rule,
however, makes it highly vulnerable to attack. Whether suppres-
sion of improperly obtained evidence actually deters illegal police
behavior is subject to question.43 With its deterrent benefit in
doubt then, opponents of the rule argue its costs are too high and
its benefits too low. The rule's detractors now use this cost benefit
argument to justify a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
II. THE CASE FOR A GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
Advocates of a good faith exception first focus on the general
costs of any exclusionary rule application. They stress that physi-
cal evidence is reliable whether or not illegally obtained. The pub-
lic, consequently, perceives excluding such reliable evidence as
merely freeing countless guilty defendants44 who then are able to
commit further offenses. 45 The rule further impairs the truth-find-
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (bank depositor has no fourth amendment
privacy interest in copies of bank checks and deposit slips retained by bank); Smith v. Ma-
ryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (no expectation of privacy in phone numbers dialed); Chambers
v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (the expectation of privacy in automobiles is sufficiently
reduced to justify a search with probable cause but without warrant).
43. As Professor Francis Allen observed, "the case for the rule as an effective deterrent
of police misbehavior has proved, at best, to be an uneasy one." Allen, The Judicial Quest
for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 537.
44. The fourth amendment exclusionary rule, therefore, may have significantly more
harmful effects than the exclusion of incriminating statements obtained in violation of fifth
amendment guarantees. Police tactics violating the fifth amendment purportedly threaten
the reliability of the verbal evidence so gathered. In contrast, little doubt exists about the
reliability of physical evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. Furthermore,
confessions frequently only serve to cement a conviction. See Interrogations in New Haven:
The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1588 (1967). In contrast, judicial suppression of
evidence obtained by illegal police searches actually may be determinative in some prosecu-
tions, especially those dealing with consensual offenses. See Oaks, supra note 3, at 746.
45. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 413-16 (1971)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free If The Constable Blunders?,
50 Tax. L. REv. 736, 741 (1972). Fourth amendment decisions, unlike decisions concerning
self-incrimination, are not directed predominately toward police treatment of the poor and
ignorant. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 505 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Rather,
their greatest impact is upon police investigations of activities frequently controlled by or-
ganized crime. Physical evidence is most essential in proving the offenses of gambling, pros-
titution, counterfeiting, and narcotics distribution. See Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1028; Oaks,
supra note 3, at 681-89. Furthermore, the consensual nature of many of these offenses, cou-
pled with the fear organized crime can inflict on its members and victims, makes police
fulfillment of the traditional demands of probable cause before search unusually difficult.
Trickery and deception, often perceived by law enforcement officials as necessary to over-
come evidentiary difficulties in dealing with sophisticated crime, are the very seeds from
which fourth amendment problems are born. Former New York City Police Commissioner
Vincent L. Broderick stated:
The narcotics agent-local or federal-who seeks evidence against organized criminals
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1511
ing function of the trial proceeding, exclusionary rule opponents
argue, because the rule's application diverts the trial's focus from
ascertaining the guilt or innocence of the defendant to examining
police behavior.46 Additionally, critics assail the suppression rem-
edy as protecting only those against whom police discover incrimi-
nating evidence while providing no protection for innocent persons
subjected to illegal but fruitless searches.47 Its opponents, there-
fore, insist that each application of the exclusionary rule exacts a
substantial societal cost for the vindication of fourth amendment
rights.48
The exclusionary rule's indifference to the seriousness of the
defendant's alleged offense or the severity of the police officer's in-
fraction accentuates the appearance of excessive cost. Critics at-
tack as "contrary to the idea of proportionality that is essential to
the concept of justice' 49 the universal "capital punishment" that
the rule inflicts on all improperly acquired evidence regardless of
apparent disparities which at times can exist between the officer's
error and the degree of a defendant's likely guilt. These critics, fur-
necessarily operates undercover, on the street, masquerading as someone he is not.
Similarly the Secret Service agent attempting to capture counterfeiters assumes the
identity of an underworld purchaser of counterfeit bills. Laws against consensual
crimes, such as gambling and vice, can be enforced effectively only if police officers in
plainclothes conceal their true identities and adopt other ones. Deception and trickery?
Certainly. How else can we cope with sophisticated crime?
Broderick, Book Review, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 737, 741 (1968); see also A Forum on the
Interrogation of the Accused, 49 CORNELL L. Rsv. 382, 394 (1964). Clearly, then, exclusion
of illegally seized physical evidence can impede law enforcement efforts to convict the guilty
more severely than does exclusion of illegally obtained confessions.
46. Oaks, supra note 3, at 755.
47. See Irvin v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954); Oaks, supra note 3, at 755.
48. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137 (1978). See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S.
727, 734 (1980). The cost of losing inherently trustworthy evidence may tempt courts either
to water down the standards for probable cause, Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights,
and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 Stip. CT. REv. 46, 66, or to draw unrealistic distinctions in
favor of law enforcement, Ashdown, supra note 3, at 1315, in order to avoid the exclusionary
effects of a potential fourth amendment violation. Justice White, in his Gates concurrence,
suggested the monetary cost of exclusion also should be considered. Citing the Comptroller
General's study of the impact of the exclusionary rule on federal prosecutions, White noted
that one-third of federal defendants going to trial file fourth amendment suppression mo-
tions; 70% to 90% of such motions included the expense of formal hearings. 103 S. Ct. at
2343 (White, J., concurring) (citing COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, IMPACT
OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 10 (1979)).
49. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976). "[S]ociety has ... [a] right to expect
rationally graded responses from judges in place of the universal 'capital punishment' we
inflict on all evidence when police error is shown in its acquisition." Bivens v. Six Unknown
Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 419 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The sense of the
criminal defendant's windfall, of course, is greatest when the officer allegedly made the error
in good faith.
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thermore, herald the rejection by other nations of a comparable
rule excluding evidence illegally obtained ° as proof that the doc-
trine is both unwise and unnecessary. Thus, although the exclu-
sionary rule's supporters defend it as a deterrent to unlawful police
activity in part through the nurturing of respect for fourth amend-
ment values,51 others fear that the public perception of a judicial
system easy on criminals and unresponsive to the cries for greater
security does considerable damage to the reputation of the crimi-
nal justice system and generates disrespect for the law generally.52
If the exclusionary rule is nothing but a judicially created de-
vice chosen from among other devices to enforce fourth amend-
ment guarantees5s and if this device truly has led to widespread
public disfavor with the criminal justice system," then judicial
50. England, Canada, Germany, and Israel all have refused to exclude evidence ob-
tained through illegal police searches and seizures. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 415 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); Wilkey, supra note 3, at 217.
51. The Mapp court, for example, justified the exclusionary rule partially upon the
need for legal institutions to educate the public through example. "If the government be-
comes a law breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto
himself; it invites anarchy." 367 U.S. at 659.
52. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 (1976); Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule
and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE ScL 255, 256 (1961);
Wilkey, supra note 3, at 223; Wright, supra note 45, at 737.
Not only the public may react negatively to such a situation, but some jurists may as
well, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 414 (1971) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting), and undoubtedly law enforcement officers also lose respect for a system
they perceive as forcing the government to play the game fairly despite the criminal oppo-
nent's ruthlessness.
53. The fourth amendment, unlike the fifth, does not explicitly mandate exclusion of
evidence as the proper response for violation of its guarantees. This textual distinction be-
tween the amendments, coupled with court decisions justifying fourth amendment exclusion
on the basis of its deterrent value, has led many critics to view the fourth amendment's
exclusionary rule as a judicially created device rather than as an integral aspect of the con-
stitutional right. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976); Wilkey, supra note 3, at 216;
Crovitz, Exclusionary Rule Lives in a World Apart, Wall St. J., June 30, 1983, at 28, col. 3.
Clearly, this was not the Weeks Court's perspective of the importance of the rule in guaran-
teeing fourth amendment rights. See supra text accompanying notes 21-24.
54. The extent and depth of public disapproval in some quarters is clearly apparent in
newspaper editorials. See, e.g., Houston Post, Editorial, Nov. 16, 1977, at 2E (The results of
the exclusionary rule lead to "an absurdity that would likely be sensibly ordered in a more
primitive society."); Washington Star, Editorial, July 7, 1975, at A16 (The exclusionary rule
"is sometimes an outrage to common sense."); Wall St. J., Editorial, July 12, 1971, at 8, col.
1 ("Given the ... need to bolster public confidence that courts do dispense justice, it's
scarcely unreasonable to ask that [the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule] be reexam-
ined.") See also Crovitz, supra note 53, at 28, col. 6 ("The present U.S. exclusionary rule
does substantive injustice.")
Professor John Kaplan reports that public opinion polls show a high rate of disapproval
for courts seen by the public as coddling criminals. He identifies the exclusionary rule as the
prototype judicial doctrine causing this perception. Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1035-36.
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concern over the rule is justified.5  The legitimacy of law exists on
a foundation of faith. The public must perceive its views of "good"
and "right" as prevailing rather than being circumvented by insti-
tutional machinations or it may lose its belief in the ultimate
moral nature of law. The loss of such a belief can lead to spiritually
unstable institutions and a general weakening of governmental
legitimacy.58
Societal faith thus is essential for effective functioning of any
legal system. The criminal justice system, in addition to controlling
unacceptable deviance, also serves to control the response by socie-
tal enforcers to such deviance.5 Although vendetta and mob rule
could serve to control deviance, only a criminal justice system that
also controls the controllers can enhance human dignity. A justice
system that limits the enforcers, however, will be able to promote
human dignity only if the system fulfills public expectations of so-
cietal protection sufficiently to remain legitimate. When legal insti-
tutions so limit the enforcers that the community believes its
needs for safety and justice are unfulfilled, however, the system
may lose its legitimacy and thus its power to control societal re-
sponses to deviance. Excessive judicial concern for individual
rights in the face of a public outcry for greater safety, conse-
quently, may lead to a popular backlash decreasing rather than en-
hancing respect and conformity to enforcement limitations.5 8
If utilization of the exclusionary rule leads to lost system legit-
imacy, the cost is high indeed.59 But detractors of the exclusionary
rule do not rest their position on costs alone; they also stress the
55. As Chief Justice (then Judge) Warren Burger remarked, "If a majority-or even a
substantial minority-of the people in any given community... come to believe that law
enforcement is being frustrated by what laymen call 'technicalities,' there develops a sour
and bitter feeling that is... sociologically unhealthy." Burger, Who will Watch the Watch-
man?, 14 AM. U.L. REv. 1, 22 (1964).
56. For a fuller discussion of the legitimation of law, see Ingber, The Interface of
Myth and Practice in Law, 34 VAND. L. Rv. 309, 338-46 (1981).
57. This dual purpose of criminal law is developed in Ingber, A Dialectic: The Fulfill-
ment and Decrease of Passion in Criminal Law, 28 RuTG. L. REv. 861, 863-68 (1975).
58. Fear of such a backlash was the basis of Justice White's dissent in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). He expressed concern that the call for human dignity in the
name of the defendant had gone too far. If governmental authority was unable to protect
the public from crime because of judicially imposed limitations on law enforcement, White
feared that "those who rely on the public authority for protection" might revert to the sav-
age techniques generally associated with self-help. Id. at 542 (White, J., dissenting). He fur-
ther asserted that "[w]ithout the reasonably effective performance of the task of preventing
private violence and retaliation, it is idle to talk about human dignity and civilized values."
Id. at 539.
59. But see infra text accompanying notes 309-16.
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limited benefits of the rule. As developed earlier,6 0 the main articu-
lated and recognized benefit of the exclusionary rule is deterrence
of illegal police behavior. Scholars" and Supreme Court Justices,62
however, have expressed grave doubts on whether the exclusionary
rule actually influences police behavior. Statistics do not support
the rule's efficiency in deterring police misbehavior since criminal
defendant's make many motions to suppress illegally obtained evi-
dence each year. The abundance of such motions, however, also
does not support the conclusion that the rule is ineffective. No way
exists to determine whether many more fourth amendment viola-
tions would occur without the rule. The statistical battle, there-
fore, often turns upon who has the burden of proof: the rule's pro-
ponents to verify its deterrent value or its opponents to verify its
lack of such value. 4 Despite the lack of statistical proof either for
or against the rule's deterrent value, at least three factors justify
some intuitive doubt as to the rule's ability to influence police be-
havior: ideology of the police subculture, police goals other than
criminal convictions, and lack of meaningful communications be-
tween the courts and police.
Police gain their identity from their image as crime fighters.6 5
60. See supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
61. See, e.g., J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WrrHoUT TRMI 211-19 (1966); Dworkin, Fact Style
Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329
(1973); Oaks, supra note 3; Wilkey, supra note 3.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 n.5 (1974) (Powell, J.)
(doubt as to effectiveness of the exclusionary rule); Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 415-16 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("the hope that [the objective
of control of official activity] could be accomplished by the exclusion of reliable evidence
from criminal trials was hardly more than a wistful dream . . . [and] the history of the
suppression doctrine demonstrates that it is both conceptually sterile and practically inef-
fective in accomplishing its stated objective").
63. See Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961
Sup. CT. Rav. 1, 34.
64. The burden of proof issue, always implicit in the exclusionary rule deterrence con-
troversy, recently has become an explicit focus of the conflict. Compare Canon, The Exclu-
sionary Rule: Have Critics Proven that It Doesn't Deter Police?, 62 JUDICATURE 398 (1979)
with Schlesinger, supra note 3.
65. The popular view of the police officer in this society, at least of the urban police
officer that predominately has influenced the constitutional developments in criminal inves-
tigatory procedures, is one of a committed crime fighter protecting society. This image,
largely based on the false belief that police devote most of their time to crime prevention,
influences both who choses to join the police force and the self-image of those on the force.
See Goldstein, Police Policy Formulation: A Proposal for Improving Police Performance, 65
MICH. L. Rzv. 1123, 1124-25 (1967). Thus, although police spend most of their time dealing
with family squabbles, noisy disturbances, and requests for various forms of services and
information, law enforcement officials gear police agencies primarily to deal with crime, see
Goldstein, Police Response to Urban Crisis, 28 PUBL. AD. REV. 417, 418 (1968), and police
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The police force trains its officers to perceive themselves as better
equipped for crime fighting work than anyone else. This perceived
expertise is a source of status from which police hope to gain socie-
tal recognition for their "professional" position." Police, therefore,
tend to resent any interference by outsiders that reflects upon
their professionalism or inhibits performance of their professional
responsibility to control crime. Consequently, police officers are
not predisposed to accept and accommodate the court imposed ex-
clusionary rule.6 7
Police officers' increasing isolation from the rest of the com-
munity accentuates their lack of appreciation for the rule. While
police seek public admiration and support, their working personal-
ity which emphasizes danger and authority estranges them from
the conventional citizenry68 as well as from those who represent
potential threats. 9 Many civilians are uncomfortable about includ-
ing police officers among close acquaintances." The extreme mor-
alistic nature of the criminal law that police must enforce only ex-
acerbates this civilian concern about socializing with police officers.
Police, in turn, perceive themselves as representing authority.
see crime fighting as the "real" police work, see J. SKOLNICK, supra note 61, at 220.
66. Professionalization brings a sense of individual worth through identification with a
group publicly recognized as better than others at performing a specific job.
67. "[The police officer's] perception of himself as a crime-fighting craftsman," notes
Professor Albert Quick, "is outwardly manifested by a general hostility toward concepts of
procedural due process and those institutions that are identified with securing individual
rights-the courts and the liberal elements of society." Quick, Attitudinal Aspects of Police
Compliance with Procedural Due Process, 6 Am. J. Crm. L. 25, 26 (1978).
68. See J. SKOLNICK, supra note 61, at 44.
69. According to Professor Jerome Skolnick,
The element of danger seems to make the policeman especially attentive to signs indi-
cating a potential for violence and lawbreaking. As a result, the policeman is generally
a "suspicious" person.
[B]ecause his work requires him to be occupied continually with potential
violence, [he] develops a perceptional shorthand to identify certain kinds of people as
symbolic assailants, that is, as persons who use gesture, language, and attire that the
policeman has come to recognize as a prelude to violence.
Id. at 44-45. See also Piliavin & Briar, Police Encounters with Juveniles, 70 AM. J. Soc. 206
(1964). Often having to make instantaneous decisions, a police officer is likely to form and to
use stereotypes to facilitate his decisionmaking. Police may watch blacks, the poor, and
those acting in any way out of the ordinary more warily, not necessarily out of any
prejudice, but because these groups represent higher statistical risks of danger to society.
See Balch, The Police Personality: Fact or Fiction?, 63 J. Cram. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE
Sci. 106, 111 (1972).
70. Civilians' knowledge that police officially are always on duty and frequently carry
guns generally inhibits civilians' speech and actions when in police presence. See Hahn, A
Profile of Urban Police, 36 LAw & CONTsMP. PROBs. 449, 453 (1971).
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Thus, they feel unable to shed this pose and act naturally except
among other officers and their families. A tendency, therefore, ex-
ists for police officers to nearly totally restrict both their profes-
sional and social relationships to other members of the police
force.7 1 This alienation from society and dependence upon other
officers for needed support and approval results in the creation of a
police subculture, which provides a basis for self-respect somewhat
independent of civilian norms.72
The prevalent attitudes of this police subculture, conse-
quently, far more than any abstract judicial articulation of right
and wrong, determine the pressure police experience to abide by
court imposed restrictions on their crime fighting ability.73 Officers,
"engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime, 7 4 may gain peer support or even reward for behavior that
the courts would not consider legal. 5 The need to respond situa-
tionally either to a perceived danger to others or to a threat
against his own authority may provoke an officer into action that
courts do not approve.7 6 As long as the officer strongly identifies
with the police subculture, which approves of his behavior, he hasimmediate and certain reinforcement from his primary peer group.
The mere possibility that sometime in the future, at trial or on
appeal, some aversive contingency may follow is significantly less
effective in controlling his future behavior.7 7 In fact, given the ex-
71. See M. BANTON, THE POLICEMAN IN THE COMMUNITY 188-219 (1964).
72. Lipset, Why Cops Hate Liberals-and Vice Versa, THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 1969, at
80.
73. The existence of a powerful police subculture results in police officers potentially
lacking awareness of the offsetting value positions possessed by individuals who identify
with numerous groups. Strong group cohesion among officers reinforces their attitudes and
limits needed appreciation and status to that given by the subculture. See J. SKOLNICK,
supra note 61, at 219. Society's evaluation becomes far less important to a police officer than
his peer group evaluation. Consequently, the impact of nonpolice criticism is minimal in
affecting police esteem and, thus, behavior.
74. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
75. For example, valued goals of the police subculture include return of stolen goods
or confiscation of contraband. See infra text accompanying notes 82-83. Furthermore,
judges are rule oriented; police are situation oriented. The police officer "approaches inci-
dents that threaten order not in terms of enforcing the law but in terms of 'handling the
situation.'" J. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 31 (1968) (emphasis omitted). Conse-
quently, police view many strategies that would be illegal from a judicial standpoint as to-
tally justifiable.
76. Chief Justice Warren recognized the inability of the exclusionary rule to deter po-
lice behavior in circumstances that the police officer finds threatening. See Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1968).
77. Chief Justice Burger, in a vigorous dissent assailing the exclusionary rule, noted
that "the long time lapse-often several years-between the original police action and its
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clusionary rule's focus on trial proceedings, it arguably has more
effect on the prosecution than on the offending police officer."
Whether the prosecutor's inability to gain a conviction will influ-
ence the police depends on whether police interests encompass
concerns other than successful prosecution.
A review of institutional incentives and pressures affecting po-
lice, however, shows that numerous purposes other than obtaining
convictions at trial79 may induce officers to use searches and ar-
rest.8 0 For example, law enforcement agencies often rely upon the
percentage of reported cases "cleared by arrest" as a measure of
police alertness and professionalism." Since an arrest need not re-
sult in a conviction to affect favorably the "clearance rate," this
institutionalized sign of police success subtly encourages illegal
searches and arrests.
The public itself sometimes encourages illegal searches and
seizures by vehemently demanding more aggressive law enforce-
ment.8 1 In an attempt to gain broader societal acceptance while
still fulfilling their subculture's primary objective of fighting crime,
final judicial evaluation" dilutes any "deterrent impact" on police of evidence suppressions.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 417-18 (1971).
78. The Court may be incapable of using evidentiary decisions as a means of control-
ling pretrial police behavior. See Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 350-51.
79. Because a knowing and intelligent guilty plea does not require the defendant's
awareness of evidentiary defenses, Edwards v. United States, 256 F.2d 707, 710 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 847 (1958), and because all prior police behavior may be invulnerable
to attack once defendant enters such a plea, see Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973);
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), the incriminating evidence illegally gained may
sufficiently impress a defendant that he will plead guilty and avoid trial. Illegal searches,
consequently, still may aid in gaining convictions.
80. See Dworkin, supra note 61, at 330; Oaks supra note 3, at 721-22; see also Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968) (exclusionary rule is powerless when police motive is other than
successful prosecution).
81. See J. GRIFFIN, STATISTICS ESSENTIAL FOR POLICE EFFICIENCY 69 (1958); J. SKOL-
NICK, supra note 61, at 167. Bureaucratic pressures can significantly affect police attitudes.
The factors used to evaluate merit and the heirarchy of roles all act as a system of incen-
tives for the officer intent on advancing within the force. The police bureaucracy places
value on obedience and efficiency. "Real" police work-work that gains both peer and offi-
cial acknowledgement-involves catching criminals. An officer rarely gets credit for not ar-
resting, searching, or questioning. In addition, "it is relatively easier to measure output re-
flected by the number of people arrested and the number of crimes solved than it is to
measure, for example, the number of people whose rights were protected. In a sense mea-
surement determines goals." Milner, Supreme Court Effectiveness and the Police Organiza-
tion, 36 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 467, 472 (1971) (footnote omitted). See also Newman, The
Effect of Accommodations in Justice Administration on Criminal Statistics, 46 Soc. & Soc.
RESEARCH 144 (1962).




police frequently respond to such public pressure by making ar-
rests as efficiently and quickly as possible. While such arrests may
not gain judicial acceptance, they certainly improve the police's
public image. Community dissatisfaction, consequently, shifts from
what the public could have perceived as ineffective law enforce-
ment to what now it perceives as an overly technical court. Public
support and peer approval also can encourage illegal police behav-
ior if the officer, through an illegal search or seizure, can perform a
socially valuable service such as rescuing a kidnap victim, re-
turning stolen goods to their rightful owner, or removing narcotics
from the streets. Often police find lost convictions preferable to
lost opportunities to fulfill these goals."'
Police also believe that substantially increasing the expenses
attendant to criminal activity aids in their crime fighting responsi-
bility. Confiscation of criminal paraphenalia, the necessity for re-
peated bail payments, and the inconvenience and time loss that
the criminal experiences in arrest procedures all serve to cripple
criminal activity whether or not the corresponding searches and
seizures ultimately result in conviction. Incarceration prior to trial
can remove a danger 84 or public nuisance 5 from the streets, some-
times dissipating the problem despite the lack of a permanent con-
viction. Police may view arrest of a delinquent juvenile or a petty
hoodlum as necessary to reestablish official authority and reinforce
respect for the law. Additionally, arrest and search intimidation
greatly facilitates recruitment of informers, allegedly so vital in
fighting organized crime, regardless of any police intent to press
for prosecution.
Accordingly, the police have many alternative goals to convic-
tion that, at times, serve to encourage illegal behavior.88 When one
or more of these goals is present in a situation, the exclusionary
83. As the importance of the "pinch" becomes greater, the deterrence value of the
exclusionary rule correspondingly increases. Ironically, the public most questions the exclu-
sionary rule precisely when the crime is serious and the rule most likely will deter illegal
police behavior. Professor Kaplan, for example, has recommended exempting police misbe-
havior relating to serious crimes from the rule's coverage. Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1046-49.
84. Fearing flare-ups of teenage gang rivalries, for example, police may incarcerate
gang leaders until passions have calmed.
85. For example, police often pick up prostitutes and drunks simply to remove them
from the streets.
86. Some critics even have suggested that the exclusionary rule allows corrupt officers
to appear to attempt zealous enforcement of the law while, through use of illegal searches,
immunizing from effective prosecution those criminals willing to pay the price. Dash, Cracks
in the Foundation of Criminal Justice, 45 ILL. L. REV. 385, 391-92 (1951); Wilkey, supra
note 3, at 226.
19831 1527
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
rule's deterrent value likely is minimal. Furthermore, if the police
view the fourth amendment standards as impossible to fulfill, these
alternative goals become of primary rather than secondary impor-
tance. Difficulties in the court's communications with the police
make the amendment's standards at least difficult to understand,
if not impossible to fulfill.
Even assuming police desire to gain a conviction in a given
case, they must still know and understand what the court requires
of them before the exclusionary rule can deter their illegal behav-
ior. The case-by-case method of constitutional adjudication in
search and seizure matters often creates decisions no broader in
application than the case at hand.87 Additionally, court opinions,
striving to gain and retain a court majority, are rarely models of
clarity.8 Issues that badly divide the Supreme Court, fostering
strong dissents, further confuse police understanding of what the
Court requires of them.89 Police, therefore, may receive little guid-
ance for their behavior in the diverse situations that may confront
them. 0 Consequently, the deterrent benefit of the rule once again
is put in question.9 1
87. E.g., United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983); Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct.
1319 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218 (1973).
88. Often a dissenting opinion in a Supreme Court decision surpasses the Court's
opinion in logic and clarity. This occurs because the dissenter does not need to appease his
colleagues to retain a majority or worry about how his opinion actually will affect the law's
practical functioning. The majority opinion, on the other hand, must satisfy all the joining
Justices and must consider carefully whether the decision will obtain the public support
required for legitimacy and peaceful compliance.
89. Prosecutors trying to educate police about court cases face these same obstacles.
90. One scholar argues that the fact orientation of appellate court decisions is the
greatest impediment to control of police. Dworkin, supra note 61, at 334. Another author
recommends that courts draw "bright lines" formulating a clear set of rules that, in most
instances, will allow police to quickly reach a correct determination of whether a situation
constitutionally justifies an invasion of privacy. LaFave, supra note 3, at 320-24. The Su-
preme Court, in recent years, has made some steps in this direction. See United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
91. Attempting to limit the costs of the exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court has cre-
ated the exceptions discussed supra in text accompanying notes 38-42. Ironically, these at-
tempts to limit the rule's costs likely have the corresponding impact of reducing its deter-
rent benefit. For example, because motions to exclude illegally obtained evidence only may
be made by a person with the requisite standing, Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165,
174 (1969), such evidence may have great trial utility. The requisite standing exists only
when police violate that particular defendant's legitimate expections of privacy. Rawlings v.
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); Rakas v. nlinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). This standing require-
ment has encouraged illegal searches, especially illegal wiretapping and electronic eaves-
dropping. These devices are most useful in attacking organized crime. For example, the in-
formation obtained by police through an illegal wiretap may not be used against the owner
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The above arguments suggest that from a utilitarian perspec-
tive the exclusionary rule has excessive costs and limited benefits.
Opponents, thus, advocate total abandonment of the rule,92 or at
least, through judicial recognition of a good faith exception, further
restriction of the rule's effects in situations in which its benefits
are least likely. The proponents of a good faith exception base
their arguments on reason and precedent. If courts exclude evi-
dence in order to deter unlawful police behavior, exclusion argua-
bly has no value when the officer is honestly and reasonably una-
ware that his behavior is illegal. An officer acting in a manner he
believes consistent with fourth amendment mandates has no rea-
son to fear exclusion and, thus, no motivation to alter his con-
duct.93 In such circumstances, good faith exception proponents
note, exclusion retains its high cost without even the semblance of
any deterrent benefit gains. Furthermore, releasing a hardened
criminal because of insufficient evidence while "punishing" a dili-
gent police officer for making a reasonable good faith error in a
complex area of law seems manifestly unjust.
The Fifth Circuit has extended this logical position. In addi-
tion to having no deterrent benefit, argued the court, exclusion of
evidence obtained by a good faith error affects police behavior in
an undesirable manner. The court insisted that an officer, pun-
ished for behavior he honestly believed was legal, would eventually
become reluctant to act when his "proper and reasonable instinct
tells him that the activity he observes is criminal. ' 9 4 The above
utilitarian perspective, thus, provides proponents of a good faith
of the phone or against those participating in the overheard conversation. Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165, 178-79 (1969). For police willing to trade the lower echelon of
the criminal world for the higher-ups, however, illegal wiretaps can produce evidence admis-
sible against anyone other than those owning the phone or participating in the discussions
because they lack standing to object. Id. at 171-72, 174. See also United States v. Payner,
447 U.S. 727 (1980). Since fighting organized crime is an important police goal, the standing
requirement depletes the rule of much of its deterrent value. While the exclusionary rule's
critics approve of the standing requirement because it reduces the rule's costs, they fail to
note that it is a primary cause of their second objection to the rule, the limited deterrent
value of exclusion.
92. Even staunch critics of the exclusionary rule have sometimes expressed concern
over the negative symbolic effect abandoning the rule prior to the development of some
meaningful substitute might have upon fourth amendment interests. Bivins v. Six Unknown
Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 415 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Kaplan, supra
note 3, at 1055; Oaks, supra note 3, at 756.
93. Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1044.
94. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 842 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (quoting




exception with a logical and initially appealing argument.
In addition to this utilitarian logic, exception proponents offer
precedent to demonstrate that a good faith exception is not incon-
sistent with fourth amendment doctrine but rather is simply the
fruition of a developing trend. The two cases most frequently men-
tioned by those advocating the exception are United States v.
Peltier95 and Michigan v. DeFillippo.96 In Peltier the Supreme
Court refused to retroactively apply its holding in Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States.97 In Almeida-Sanchez a roving border
patrol seeking illegal aliens discovered contraband during a vehicle
search. Neither probable cause nor consent existed for the search;
the car was simply in the general vicinity of the Mexican border.
The Court found the evidence seized inadmissible. The search in
Peltier predated the Almeida-Sanchez opinion. In finding for the
government the Court used language the meaning of which, some
insist, extends far beyond the parameters of a retroactivity
controversy:
If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct[,]
then evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be
said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be
charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the
Fourth Amendment. 8
Such language, claim those supporting an exception, signals the
Court's disapproval of applying the exclusionary rule when police
act both reasonably and in good faith.
Michigan v. DeFillippo concerns a somewhat more complex
factual situation than Peltier. Police arrested defendant for violat-
ing a Detroit ordinance requiring a person lawfully stopped by po-
lice to produce evidence of his identity. During the search incident
to this arrest police found drugs on defendant's person. The Michi-
gan Court of Appeals, finding the ordinance under which the arrest
occurred unconstitutionally vague, believed that both the related
arrest and search, thus, were invalid. The state court, therefore,
overturned the defendant's drug offense conviction. The Supreme
Court reversed.
The Court accepted the state court finding that the ordinance
under which the police made the initial arrest was unconstitu-
tional. The Court, however, held constitutional the police officer's
95. 422 U.S., 531 (1975).
96. 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
97. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
98. 422 U.S. at 542 (emphasis added).
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behavior and the resulting drug conviction. In upholding the
search, the Court insisted that it should not require a prudent po-
lice officer to anticipate that a court subsequently will find invalid
the ordinance under which he is making an arrest and incidental
search. 9
Exception proponents use DeFillippo as precedential support
for a good faith exception under the following reasoning: If courts
cannot require a prudent officer to anticipate the ultimate consti-
tutionality of an ordinance before a search can be valid, how can
the courts require such an officer to anticipate a change in the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of fourth amendment guarantees?
Exception proponents argue it is equally, if not more, inappropri-
ate to punish an officer for resolving a situational crisis in a man-
ner consistent with that recommended by many of the most delib-
erative legal minds merely because five of the nine sitting Supreme
Court Justices reject his actions. The proponents, thus, argue that
a general reasonable good faith exception is consistent with the
spirit and logic of such precedent.
This Article has now described the historical development of
the exclusionary rule, presented the arguments opposing the rule,
and presented the logic and precedent supporting a good faith ex-
ception. The Article now shall prove that recognition of a good
faith exception would be at best inadvisable; at worst, disastrous.
III. THE CONCEPTUAL FLAWS OF THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
A good faith exception to the exclusionary rule has a number
of serious conceptual flaws. The exception would thwart any vindi-
cation of recognized fourth amendment rights, and thereby depre-
cate the constitutional provision itself. Furthermore, the concept of
deterrence, which detractors use to attack the exclusionary rule
and thus to support the good faith exception, is improperly nar-
row. Most significantly, adoption of the exception would affect det-
rimentally the substance and development both of the fourth
amendment and of the sixth amendment right to counsel.
A. The Vindication of Right
1. The Concept of Right
At the most conceptual level, the utilitarian perspective sur-
rounding and justifying the exclusionary rule generally and the
99. 443 U.S. at 37-38.
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good faith exception specifically is misdirected. For the concept of
right in this constitutional system to have any significance, it must
embody more than an arithmetic computation of costs and bene-
fits. In a democratic system of government, dominant viewpoints of
established groups need no protection. Electoral accountability en-
sures that public officials who regularly dissociate themselves from
or interfere with popularly accepted perceptions of public welfare
cannot obtain or hold their positions. Only speech, religions, and
claims of individual prerogative that the public does not recognize
in their situational context 00 as generally advancing societal inter-
ests need protection under the auspices of "right." "The institu-
tion of rights against the Government," insists Professor Ronald
Dworkin, "is not a gift of God, or an ancient ritual or a national
sport. It is a complex and troublesome practice that makes the
Government's job of securing the general benefit more difficult and
more expensive . . . ,,101 If rights were cost free they would need
no constitutional articulation. The Bill of Rights is inherently anti-
governmental. It exists precisely to prohibit government from us-
ing certain specified means, whether or not such means are effi-
cient or necessary to reach what the public believes to be legiti-
mate and laudable societal goals.102
A utilitarian perspective on rights developed as an outgrowth
of the writings of the legal realists who perceived law's authority as
stemming from its ability to affect society beneficially.103 While the
end/means utilitarian justification for law advanced by the realists
appears highly appropriate in legislative and administrative poli-
cymaking forums and in the development of common law doctrine,
the justification denigrates the unique status of claims of constitu-
tional rights. Such constitutional claims take on an ethical and
normative aura that normally must transcend a cost benefit analy-
100. While the public rhetorically may embrace the value of free speech, for example,
everyone is not likely to defend the rights of Nazi's to march and demonstrate in the
predominantly Jewish community of Skokie, Illinois. See generally Goldberger, Skokie: The
First Amendment Under Attack by its Friends, 29 MERCER L. REV. 761 (1978).
101. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 198 (1977).
102. Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 353. In a democratic system, the written guaranty of
individual rights that judicial institutions are to enforce either may be (1) an act of extreme
elitism because the guaranty abrogates policies supported by popularly accountable institu-
tions or, (2) an act of self-imposed paternalism accepted by a polity not always confident of
its situational wisdom.
103. See, e.g., R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1954).
According to Professor Roscoe Pound, a renowned spokesman of the utilitarian perspective,
law is concerned with "social engineering" and the lawyer and jurist, at least when fulfilling
their most creative roles, are "social engineers." Id. at 47.
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sis within the specific situational contexts in which the claims
arise. The rights' acceptance in light of their cost demands a sense
of their transcendental value, their mysticism, rather than merely
their instrumental justification. 04 Justice Brennan recognized the
uniqueness of claims of right when he wrote, "the efficacy of the
Bill of Rights as the bulwark of our national liberty depends pre-
cisely upon public appreciation of the special character of constitu-
tional prescriptions."' 05
Certainly, to argue that resource availability and the impact
on important societal goals are irrelevant to the recognition and
acceptance of a claim of constitutional right would be simplistic
and constitutionally naive. When the Justices claim that such con-
siderations are improper,' they most often merely are acknowl-
104. Courts considered and supported the non-pragmatic but symbolic role of law dur-
ing the Watergate debates over the amenability of the President to judicial process. Judge
Wilkey of the District of Columbia Circuit writing in dissent asked the realist's question:
"[I]f the court . . . has no physical power to enforce its subpoena should the President
refuse to comply. . .[then] what purpose is served by determining whether the President is
'immune' from process?" Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wilkey, J.,
dissenting). The majority of the Court, however, disagreed with the implication of Judge
Wilkey's rhetorical question. Instead, they upheld the ruling of the trial judge, Judge Sirica,
who insisted, "That the Court has not the physical power to enforce its orders to the Presi-
dent is immaterial to ...resolution of the issues. ... [T]he Court has a duty to issue
appropriate orders. . . .[I]t would tarnish the Court's reputation to fail to do what it could
in pursuit of justice." In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Issued to Richard M.
Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1, 9 (D.D.C. 1973). Impact was not the issue; constitutional responsibil-
ity was.
105. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 634 (1980). Only on rare occasions in re-
cent years has the Court recognized the special character of constitutional rights that for-
bids balancing them against the interest of other societal goals. For example, in New Jersey
v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979), the Court held that testimony given under a grant of legisla-
tive immunity could not be used to impeach the witness at his later trial for misconduct in
office. Regardless of the societal interest in keeping a defendant from benefiting from a
possible perjury, the Court concluded that: "Here... we deal with the constitutional privi-
lege against compulsory self-incrimination in its most pristine form. Balancing, therefore, is
not simply unnecessary. It is impermissible." Id. at 459.
106. In Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), the Supreme Court upheld an indi-
gent's right to a free trial record for appeal purposes even though the crime was punishable
only by fine. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, insisted that
Griffin [v. Illinois] does not represent a balance between the needs of the accused and
the interests of society; its principle is a flat prohibition against pricing indigent defen-
dants out of as effective an appeal as would be available to others able to pay their own
way. . . .The state's fiscal interest is, therefore, irrelevant.
Id. at 196-97. In a society more and more conscious that resources are finite, however, deci-
sionmakers (judges and others) are more likely to recognize rights when resources are read-
ily available to effectuate such rights than when recognition would bankrupt other societal
goals. Few judges have been as candid as Judge Clement Haynesworth who, in Moffitt v.
Ross, 483 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), supported a right to ap-
pointed counsel for permissive appellate review by arguing that "[w]hat is requisite today
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edging the myths of constitutional continuity and stability, and are
using them to bolster their own position even though they are
aware that the myths are unattainable. The proper decisional pro-
cess for courts when determining whether to recognize a right pos-
sessing a scope broad enough to encompass the claim of its viola-
tion in a specific case, however, is fundamentally different from the
decisional process that courts should use once they accept the right
and find a violation. Interpretation of the open textual clauses of
the Bill of Rights may require an evaluation of whether the inter-
preted right proffered is worth the societal cost that its acceptance
would entail. If courts can define the right in such a way to allow
most of its potential benefit while reducing its cost, so much the
better.107 But once courts recognize a right, they no longer should
be able to find its enforcement too costly in specific cases. Further-
more, if the concept of right is to have any meaning, once the court
acknowledges a violation it must provide a remedy that allows the
injured individual to gain vindication for his claim. Courts, there-
fore, justifiably may consider costs and benefits when determining
the meaning and scope of rights. But consideration of such factors
is improper when the query is whether courts should grant a rem-
edy to an individual whose constitutional rights acknowledgedly
were violated by the state.
Admittedly, the fourth amendment is not cost free. Public
safety, indeed, may be more difficult to provide or expensive to
obtain when the fourth amendment restricts the types of behavior
government can utilize in fighting crime. The existence of the
amendment, however, exemplifies a societal belief that, although
community safety is a legitimate public concern, the price for such
may not have been constitutionally requisite ten years ago, or even a few years ago. As our
legal resources grow, there is correlative growth in our ability to implement basic notions of
fairness." Id. at 655.
107. This perspective explains those cases that only permit prospective application of
newly articulated criminal process rights. See, e.g, Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244
(1969); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618 (1965). Requiring retroactive application of all such rights might require the re-
lease or retrial of numerous convicted criminals. Jurists, thus, may find it difficult to accept
that the societal gain from the new interpretations is worth the societal loss that extremely
disrupting the criminal justice system would entail. Prospective only application allows for
evolution of new interpretations of process rights as ethical perspectives change without
requiring the system first to absorb the cost of former misinterpretations. Consequently,
nonretroactivity cases such as Peltier, see supra text accompanying notes 95-98, encourage
constitutional development in the fourth amendment field. This Article later notes that a
general good faith exception retards precisely such a development. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 200-15. Peltier, therefore, is distinguishable and good faith proponents cannot
justifiably view it as precedential support for a broad good faith exception.
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safety, seen in terms of lost individual privacy, can become too
great.""8 The Constitution accomplishes this accommodation of the
public's interest in safety and the individual's interest in privacy
through a guarantee of individual rights that is not absolute: the
amendment's language clearly indicates that government rightfully
can invade individual privacy when it acts reasonably, often neces-
sitating the existence of probable cause and the possession of a
warrant.10 9 An analysis of costs and benefits is built into the
amendment itself. What courts must decide in the individual case
is whether the government acted reasonably in invading the indi-
vidual's privacy, not whether protection of such privacy is too
costly or of too little benefit to support vindication of the right
once they find a violation.
A legal system that attempts simultaneously to control unac-
ceptable deviance and the behavior of the laws' enforcers 10 is un-
derstandably complex in its application to individual situations. A
result in a specific case may seem inefficient and improper."1 But
108. The development and utilization of technology capable of keeping all people
under constant surveillance could drastically reduce the threat to societal order. But, in
spite of the imminence of the year 1984, the prices of such an Orwellian state are too high.
109. Even under such a qualified right, the Constitution does inhibit somewhat the
criminal justice system's quest for truth. The searches prohibited by the fourth amendment,
if permitted, likely would expose much evidence of criminality that the courts, in turn,
could use to convict the truly guilty and acquit the truly innocent. No question exists that
the quest for truth is a fundamental goal of our criminal justice system, but it is not an
exclusive goal nor even one superior to all others. The quest for truth rather is an objective
that the criminal justice system may obtain only by means consonant with other objectives,
most particularly those established in the Constitution. Justice Brennan articulated this
view, insisting that,
The procedural safeguards mandated in the Framers' Constitution are not admonitions
to be tolerated only to the extent they serve functional purposes that ensure that the
"guilty" are punished and the "innocent" freed; rather, every guarantee enshrined in
the Constitution, our basic charter and the guarantor of our most precious liberties, is
by it endowed with an independent vitality and value, and this Court is not free to
curtail those constitutional guarantees even to punish the most obviously guilty.
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 524 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The community's concern about the effective prosecution of crime is understandable.
Society, however, must be wary for "[t]he history of liberty has largely been the history of
observance of procedural safeguards." McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
Furthermore, the relaxation of those safeguards historically almost always has taken place
in the face of plausible governmental claims of threats to good social order. Amsterdam,
supra note 3, at 354.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
111. E.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979). Police operating under a warrant to
search a bar for narcotics also searched the several patrons of the bar then present. The
state courts held the heroin discovered on one of the customers admissible because a state
statute authorized the police when executing a warrant to search all those present. The
statute's purpose was to protect the officers from attack and to prevent the disposal or con-
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such inefficiency and impropriety may be the cost of having and
enforcing controls upon the controllers-the fourth amendment,
for example-in the first place.
2. Remedy as Vindication
For constitutionally guaranteed rights to represent something
beyond simple platitudes, the remedy provided for their violation
must have some measurable consequence that vindicates the right
in a manner which "invokes and magnifies the moral and educative
force of the law."112 The exclusionary rule, of course, does provide
this needed confirmation of the right of privacy of one's person
and domain. 13 During the evolution of exclusionary rule doctrine,
however, courts increasingly have ignored the rule's efficacy in vin-
dicating the violated right. Judicial perception of the rule's pur-
pose has become misdirected. The relevant concern has switched
from whether the rule vindicates the right violated to whether it
serves to deter illegal police behavior by "punishing" a police
wrongdoer.1 1 4 The legitimate purpose of exclusion is not to place
sanctions upon the specific officer, but to impose them upon the
legal system in whose name he is functioning. Exclusion not only
vindicates the right violated, but also eliminates the appearance of
a system that encourages practically what it condemns rhetorically.
Weeks clearly defended exclusion upon this basis. 115 But
courts have interpreted Mapp as recognizing the suppression doc-
trine's utilitarian deterrent function. Mapp, however, does not dis-
cealment of those things described in the warrant. The Supreme Court reversed the convic-
tions concluding that an individual's mere presence at the site of a warranted search does
not subject him to a search of his person. Permitting such a search, however, certainly would
provide protection of the officer and prevent defeat of the warrant's goal. Despite these
efficiency concerns, however, the Court recognized that probable cause to search must be
more particularized than the statute dictated if the fourth amendment was to remain rele-
vant to individuals functioning in a mobile society. Rights and symbols took precedence
over efficiency.
112. Professor Dallin Oaks, often viewed as an exclusionary rule detractor, recognized
that the rule functions in this manner. Oaks, supra note 3, at 756.
113. If a court admitted illegally obtained evidence at trial, the propriety of the illegal
conduct would appear confirmed rather than the violated right vindicated. See Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968).
114. This focus on punishing police is very strong among the exclusionary rule's crit-
ics. Wilkey, supra note 3, at 220. The good faith exception further confuses the issue of the
fulfillment of a right with that of the culpability of an officer. Certainly, the law should not
punish a nonculpable officer. See infra text accompanying notes 142-43, & 175. But a police
officer's good faith error should not make the violation of a citizen's reasonable expectations
of privacy a matter of inconsequence and system indifference.
115. See supra note 24 and text accompanying notes 23-24.
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cuss punishment of culpable officials, but rather in using the lan-
guage of Elkins, it insists that exclusion is necessary to deter by
"compell[ing] respect for the constitutional guaranty . . .by re-
moving the incentive to disregard it.""'  Courts, thus, were to
achieve deterrence not by punishing the erring officer, but by nur-
turing respect for the right through creation of a system that in no
way supported or encouraged the right's violation. The Court rec-
ognized that the exclusionary rule would not end all illegal
searches or seizures, but it would assure that the judicial system
would not approve violations, thus ensuring the right's vindication.
Mapp's concept of deterrence was inherent in, rather than sepa-
rate from, its interest in judicial integrity and in law playing a role
as educator. The Court did not consider the exclusionary rule to be
based upon a shakey utilitarian foundation. 7
Largely due to this confusion surrounding Mapp, Supreme
Court opinions considering fourth amendment violations and their
appropriate remedies, at times, have appeared to accept inconsis-
tent or contradictory doctrines." Standing cases have required
that defendants demonstrate distinctly personal rights or interests
in the evidentiary items they seek to suppress before they can
press for an exclusionary remedy because "Fourth Amendment
rights are personal rights which may not be vicariously as-
serted." 9 Thus, prosecutors may use illegally obtained evidence at
trial against all but those whose particular expectation of privacy
the police invaded. At other times, however, the Court has insisted
that although the defendant can prove a personal violation, exclu-
sion may not be necessary. These cases view the exclusionary rule
as a "judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather
than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.
1 20
Under this doctrine the vindication of individual rights becomes
116. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656 (emphasis added).
117. Ironically, the utilitarian analysis of situationally balancing costs and benefits,
apparently accepted by a majority of the Court, may encourage law enforcement agents to
do similar balancing when considering whether to search or arrest. Given the police officer's
likely bias for ferreting out crime, see supra text accompanying notes 65-66, the utilitarian
perspective may diminish the exclusionary rule's ability to deter a specific officer from act-
ing illegally.
118. See generally Burkoff, The Court that Devoured the Fourth Amendment: The
Triumph of an Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, 58 OR. L. REv. 151 (1979).
119. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 164, 174 (1969).
120. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). See also Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 482 (1976); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 538-39 (1975).
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secondary. The primary purpose becomes regulating governmental
conduct by assuring adequate deterrence of illegality. Thus, a
prosecutor may not use unlawfully acquired evidence at trial for
his case in chief but may use the evidence for impeachment pur-
poses 21 or before a grand jury.122
Professor Anthony Amsterdam suggests that these two lines of
cases represent divergent views of the fourth amendment. Under
one view the amendment is a "collection of protections of atomistic
spheres of interest of individual citizens . . . ." Under the other
view the amendment is establishing a regulatory principle requir-
ing police to act in a certain way in order to protect people gener-
ally. '2 While the atomistic language used in the standing line of
cases does appear inconsistent with the regulation language in the
other, two explanations are possible. The first explanation accepts
that the rhetoric is inconsistent, but points out that both lines of
cases functionally support limitations upon the scope and effect of
the exclusionary rule. Under this explanation the Court is merely
focused on the unitary goal of reducing the scope and effect of the
rule and is willing to be inconsistent in its rhetoric if such inconsis-
tency furthers its goal.
The second, and more palatable explanation, argues that the
two perspectives are not inconsistent, rather, they represent two
different stages in fourth amendment analysis. The first stage con-
cerns a determination of who may demand vindication of a vio-
lated right. Only those who can demonstrate deprivation of per-
sonal rights will have the court address their claims at stage two.
The second stage concerns choosing an appropriate remedy. Not
all defendants whose fourth amendment rights the police have vio-
lated may insist upon the same remedy. At this stage, the court
may consider the public utility of various remedies. From this per-
spective, a court legitimately may restrict application of the exclu-
sionary rule "to those areas where its remedial [deterrent] objec-
tives are thought most efficaciously served. 1 2" The remedial
deterrent objective may not be as readily achievable when a police
infraction is due to a reasonable good faith error. Thus, under this
explanation the good faith exception indeed seems attractive.
An individual whose claim has reached the second stage, how-
ever, already has proved violation of his fourth amendment rights.
121. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
122. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
123. Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 367.
124. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348.
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The only question remaining is what remedy device a court should
choose to vindicate such rights. A decision against applying the ex-
clusionary rule, therefore, must assume that an alternative remedy
exists and is preferable. Otherwise a court, although acknowledging
the right's violation, would be treating it as a matter of indiffer-
ence, and the claim of right would go unvindicated. This argument
is essentially the same as that the Court made in Mapp itself:
"without the [exclusionary] rule the assurance against unreasona-
ble. . . searches and seizures would be 'a form of words,' valueless
and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable
human liberties .... ,,ls5An appropriate retort is that all this Ar-
ticle has proved is that a court must vindicate an individual whose
fourth amendment rights it recognizes as violated by imposing a
remedy of some measurable consequences, but not necessarily with
a remedy as costly to the criminal justice system as the exclusion-
ary rule. Chief Justice Burger has championed this contention ob-
serving that "[r]easonable and effective substitutes [for the exclu-
sionary rule] can be formulated . ... ,, Contrary to the Chief
Justice's assertion, however, exclusion provides the only effective
remedy for fourth amendment violations, especially those made in
good faith.
Although alternative legal remedies for illegal searches and
seizures have superficial appeal, all have serious defects. A court
likely would not issue injunctions prohibiting illegal police behav-
ior: although they could be useful against violations sanctioned by
promulgated state policy, 2 8 such injunctions likely would be inef-
125. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
126. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 421 (1971) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
127. Oaks, supra note 3, at 673.
128. Even such a limited use of injunctions is unlikely. In a recent suit, petitioner,
claiming to have been choked illegally by police who were acting consistent with police de-
partment policy, sought an injunction against such police behavior. In City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 103 S. Ct. 1660 (1983), the Supreme Court ruled that federal courts could not grant
such injunctions. The Court held that while plaintiff conceivably should receive damages for
injuries already suffered, an injunction applies to future behavior. Since the plaintiff could
not demonstrate that in the future police again would stop and illegally choke him, his need
for an equitable remedy was too speculative. Id. at 1669. The plaintiff was unable to show a
"personal stake in the outcome" of the case, id. at 1665, and thus the Court dismissed plain-
tiff's appeal for lack of an established case or controversy. Justice Marshall noted in dissent
that the ruling virtually removed an entire class of constitutional violations from the courts'
equitable powers. "It immunizes from prospective equitable relief," he insisted, "any policy
that authorizes persistent deprivations of constitutional rights as long as no individual can




fective against situational violations by individual police officers.12
Criminal prosecution of police officers for improper searches and
seizures also would be ineffective. Police are reluctant to arrest,
prosecutors are reluctant to prosecute, and juries are reluctant to
convict officers who make illegal searches in an effort to protect
society from crime.130
Additionally, although improper police behavior is a common-
law tort, juries are not likely to find significant damages13 1 against
police, especially in favor of a plaintiff accused or convicted of
crime.3 2 Besides, damages may not be collectible if the officer
lacks recoverable resources and sovereign immunity protects the
officer's employing governmental unit.133 Although Monell v. De-
partment of Social Services"" held that injured parties could sue
cities for violating constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the
Supreme Court specifically cautioned that liability could not exist
unless the city's agent was acting in furtherance of official policy.1 15
Consequently, most illegal searches and seizures, involving situa-
tional use of discretion by police, can not lead to governmental lia-
bility. Thus, tort liability also proves an ineffective remedy for
these fourth amendment violations. Even assuming such liability
were available, however, such a remedy might give the impression
that government has the authority to simply buy out of any re-
sponsibility it has to comply with constitutional commands. Dam-
ages from illegal searches then would become just one more added
129. The Court often has demonstrated its lack of enthusiasm for granting injunctions
that would require active and continuous monitoring by the courts in the situational enter-
prise of police work. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.
488 (1974).
130. Edwards, Criminal Liability for Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 41 VA. L.
REV. 621, 628-29(1955); see Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. at 651-52.
131. Even if juries did find damages, common law torts, such as trespass, focus upon a
different kind of damage to the plaintiff than a fourth amendment violation. "It is not the
breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the
offense," recognized Justice Clark in Mapp, "but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right
of personal security, personal liberty and private property .... 367 U.S. at 641 (quoting
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). Treating a fourth amendment violation as
simply another property tort insufficiently vindicates the claim of right involved.
132. Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MiNN. L.
Rav. 493 (1955); see generally Symposium-Police Tort Liability, 16 CLEv.-MAR. L. Rzv.
397 (1967).
133. See Dakin, Municipal Immunity in Police Torts, 16 CLEv.-M& L. REv. 448
(1967). Of course, the sovereign may waive its immunity.
134. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
135. Id. at 694. Monell, therefore, discourages police departments from prescribing
rules for police conduct. Such rules would increase the risk of departmental liability.
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cost of doing business."' 8 Such a response would not vindicate the
constitutional right but rather would diminish its luster.'137
Furthermore, more informal remedies also are impractical. Po-
lice solidarity and their intense commitment to values consistent
with their view of job requirements and professional skills"3 ' make
internal administrative review and officer discipline of questiona-
ble value. 3 9 Internal review also may exacerbate the concern seg-
ments of the community have over the bias they believe is evident
when police investigate complaints of police abuse. The appear-
ance of partiality may cause possible complainants to lose all trust
in a police-controlled system. The police's intensely negative reac-
tion to outsider control has made civilian review boards with any
power of decision and enforcement difficult to establish and
maintain. 14 0
All alternative remedies to exclusion are even more clearly in-
effective when the officer's violation was due to a reasonable good
faith error. If the police subculture tolerates and sometimes en-
courages intentional fourth amendment violations, 141 then good
faith violations could not conceivably result in intradepartmental
discipline. Criminal conviction for good faith errors is even less
conceivable or desirable. Furthermore, the requisite mens rea
would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to establish. Impo-
136. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HAav. L.
Rav. 1532, 1562 (1972).
137. Of course this danger assumes police consciously would decide to violate fourth
amendment rights if the benefits thus gained justify in their minds the damages that would
ensue. Such decisions would not be a simple good faith error. Other problems arise, how-
ever, in using tort remedies when dealing with good faith mistakes. See infra text accompa-
nying note 142.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 65-78.
139. Occupational pressures frequently require police to make instantaneous decisions.
The low visibility of the frequent discretionary actions of police limits the ability even of
police officials to direct the behavior of their rank and file. See generally Goldstein, Police
Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Adminis-
tration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960). Police, in fact, represent one of the rare bureau-
cracies in which discretion increases as one goes down the hierarchy. This inability to super-
vise the police officer on the streets constitutes an unresolved problem for those who
recommend an increased effort at rulemaking by police officials. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra
note 3, at 416-39; Caplan, The Case for Rulemaking by Law Enforcement Agencies, 36 LAW
& CON=EMP. PROBS. 500 (1971); Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1050-55. Rulemaking efforts may
succeed only in alienating police rank and file from their upper echelon.
140. Barton, Civilian Review Boards and the Handling of Complaints Against the
Police, 20 U. ToRoNTo L.J. 448 (1970); Hudson, Police Review Boards and Police Accounta-
bility, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 515 (1971). Civilian review boards in both New York City
and Philadelphia, for example, had exceedingly short lives. Hudson, supra at 522-28.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 79-86.
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sition of tort liability, in addition to all the difficulties heretofore
mentioned, is virtually impossible since courts clearly recognize
that law enforcement officers possess a common-law immunity to
civil liability for good faith errors.142
Protecting the individual offending officer from "punishment"
for good faith errors is justifiable since, although he is a wrongdoer,
he is without culpability. But inherent in the concept of a good
faith exception is the admission that the police have violated an
individual's right and the courts must vindicate his claim of right.
Once a court acknowledges the individual's claim as justified it
may choose among remedies. But as Professor Oaks conceded "[i]t
would be intolerable if the guarantee against unreasonable search
and seizure could be violated without practical consequence."' 43
Since all alternative remedies to exclusion are least convincing
when dealing with good faith police error, the suppression doctrine
is the only conceivable device for vindication of the admittedly vio-
lated right. In the context of a good faith error Justice Murphy's
dissent in Wolf is correct: "there is but one alternative to the rule
of exclusion. That is no sanction at all.' 44 Courts must not treat
constitutional violation as a matter of indifference or the public
soon will perceive the right itself similarly.
B. The Meaning of Deterrence
The preceding discussion illustrates that the proper justifica-
tion for the exclusionary rule is not its deterrent value but rather
its ability to appropriately remedy fourth amendment violations.
Since exclusion is truly the only remedy available when the offend-
ing officer has made a good faith error, focusing on the rule's in-
ability to deter such an error ignores that a violated right goes un-
remedied. Even if, however, the rule's deterrent value were a valid
consideration in deciding whether exclusion is a proper remedy for
a good faith error, the specific deterrence concept, which the ex-
ception's proponents use as their primary justification for the good
faith exception, is unnecessarily narrow.
Specific deterrence emphasizes the effect of evidence exclusion
upon the specific offending officer. The good faith exception's pro-
ponents focus on the exclusionary rule's inability to deter an of-
142. The Supreme Court discussed and extended this common law immunity to § 1983
suits in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
143. Oaks, supra note 3, at 756. Professor Oak's reputation as one of the most
respected "critics of the exclusionary rule makes this admission quite significant.
144. 338 U.S. at 41.
1542 [Vol. 36:1511
DEFENDING THE CITADEL
ficer's behavior when he, in good faith, is unaware of his transgres-
sion.14 5 Certainly, an officer who reasonably and in good faith
believes his behavior legal is not likely to avoid that behavior for
fear of exclusion. To argue that the system should not punish such
a nonculpable officer by exclusion, however, confuses the concepts
of deterrence and punishment and ignores the deterrent potential
of exclusion with respect to the officer's future behavior.
Admittedly a nonculpable officer does not deserve punish-
ment. The appropriateness of punishment, however, is a separate
and distinct concern from the rule's deterrent value. Exclusion of
the evidence seized under a reasonable good faith error undoubt-
edly has the potential to deter the officer from committing the
same error in the future.146 Consequently, while punishing a
nonculpable officer may not seem fair, such a concern should not
obscure the exclusionary rule's future deterrent potential.
Those urging a good faith exception also argue that the fear of
exclusion will not prevent an officer who has had evidence ex-
cluded because of a reasonable good faith error from thereafter
making a second good faith error in a different context. They,
therefore, argue that excluding evidence seized in reasonable good
faith has no specific deterrent effect. But this argument proves too
much. If the inability of the exclusionary rule to deter specifically
justifies a reasonable good faith exception it also justifies an unrea-
sonable good faith exception. Deleting the objective reasonableness
component of the good faith exception has no effect on this pro-
posed nondeterrence justification. An officer making an unreasona-
ble, but honestly held, good faith error is no more likely to ques-
tion his own behavior and is no more likely to have his behavior
deterred by the fear of exclusion than is the officer making a rea-
sonable good faith error. As Judge Rubin of the Fifth Circuit aptly
observed, "A policeman who is in complete subjective good faith is
145. Specific deterrence is also the focus of much of the conflict about the exclusionary
rule generally. Insisting that the suppression doctrine does not deter illegal police behavior,
see supra text accompanying notes 60-92, critics argue for its total abolition. The same crit-
ics, however, also argue that the exclusionary rule hamstrings police efforts at law enforce-
ment. This argument is paradoxical: how can the rule both fail to specifically deter and yet
hamstring the officer? For an attempt to resolve this paradox, see Ingber, Procedure, Cere-
mony and Rhetoric: The Minimization of Ideological Conflict in Deviance Control, 56
B.U.L. REv. 266, 305-07 (1976).
146. Arguably each new situation may contribute different complicating factors that
allow for new good faith mistakes. See infra text accompanying notes 150-53 for a discussion
of a method to avoid this danger.
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unlikely to stop to ask himself, 'Am I also reasonable?' "147
An unreasonable good faith exception is, of course, unaccept-
able because of the premium it would place on police ignorance. 148
Consequently, the foregoing rationale makes patently obvious that
the rule's inability specifically to deter good faith errors by offend-
ing officers cannot be the only justification for a good faith excep-
tion. If a lack of the rule's deterrent value is, indeed, a justification
for the proposed exception, then its proponents must expand their
concept of deterrence. Upon such expansion, however, the deter-
rent value of excluding evidence obtained through a good faith po-
lice error becomes obvious.
Judicial suppression of evidence also may deter generally by
influencing other officers not to duplicate the offending officer's er-
ror. An identification of the conduct causing a constitutional viola-
tion (whether committed culpably or not) will communicate to
others that a trial court will exclude the fruits of their search if
they act similarly. Hopefully such communication will prevent
such unconstitutional searches in the future. Viewed in this man-
ner, the suppression remedy does not protect only those against
whom police find incriminating evidence. The exclusion of such ev-
idence will have an "overflow effect" upon all individuals by dis-
couraging unwarranted searches whether or not they would be
fruitful. Courts then, by removing the incentive to search, would
protect the rights of both the innocent and the guilty. 49
Good faith exception proponents claim that such general de-
terrence is both unrealistic and often undesirable. They assert, for
example, that court decisions are too complex, too vague, and too
situational to give police the guidance necessary for general deter-
rence to function. The inability of police to understand judicially
articulated fourth amendment standards, however, is not related to
the issue of remedy, but is a product of the fact-orientation of
search and seizure litigation and court opinions. Unintelligible
rules of conduct will diminish the deterrent potential of any rem-
edy chosen to vindicate fourth amendment rights.
147. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 850 n.4 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981) (Rubin, J., concurring).
148. Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1044.
149. Expanding the deterrence beyond a specific infractor exposes one danger of the
good faith exception. If an officer knows that an honest and reasonable error excuses his
behavior, he willfully may feign a good faith mistake hoping that the court will find his error
reasonable without discovering the secret of his willfulness. If the good faith exception has
such an effect it would encourage both illegal searches and police perjury.
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The negative effect that judicial imprecision has had on the
exclusionary rule's general deterrent value does not now justify
recognition of a good faith exception. The deterrence problem lies
not with the rule, but rather with its judicial administration. Ad-
mittedly, the Court has made difficult its responsibility of finding a
remedy for fourth amendment violations by erroneously focusing
on the rule's deterrent value rather than on its ability to remedy
the constitutional violation, and then by negating that deterrent
value through unclear opinions. The solution, however, cannot be
the abrogation of the Court's solemn responsibility to provide a
remedy for a violated fourth amendment right.150
The manner in which to avoid decreasing the rule's deterrent
potential through court opinions unintelligible to police is not to
treat the constitutional violations with indifference, but rather to
clarify fourth amendment standards through opinions drawing
simple and understandable "bright lines" for police conduct."5
"Fourth Amendment doctrine, given force and effect by the exclu-
sionary rule," Professor LaFave observes,
is primarily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-day activities and
thus ought to be expressed in terms that are readily applicable by the police
in the context of the law enforcement activities in which they are necessarily
engaged. A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands,
and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinc-
tions, may be the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers
and judges eagerly feed, but they may be "'literally impossible of application
by the officer in the field." 152
Lack of judicial clarity should not lead to a device for excusing
fourth amendment violations, but to a method for simplifying the
task of officers truly endeavoring to respect constitutional preroga-
tives.1 53 Consequently, those urging adoption of a good faith excep-
150. The good faith exception, as already demonstrated, leaves the violated right un-
remedied. See supra text accompanying notes 141-44.
151. In recent years courts have made some attempts to formulate such bright lines.
See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454
(1981).
152. LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The
Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 127, 141 (footnotes omitted). Of course, while opin-
ions setting out "bright lines" more clearly would communicate search and seizure stan-
dards for police, not all bright lines are equally defensible. See LaFave, supra note 3, at 325-
33. Conflicts over where the courts should draw the line-what they should define the stan-
dard of conduct to be-would continue. See id.
153. Ironically, a court that often has rejected the precision of per se rules for the
flexibility (and uncertainty) of "totality of circumstances" analysis, see Manson v.
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); supra note 87 and accompanying text, also bemoans the
inability of law enforcement officials to deduce appropriate constitutional standards. When
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tion should not justify the exception on the grounds that lack of
judicial clarity creates general deterrence problems.
Exception proponents, however, also argue that general deter-
rence in a good faith context actually may be undesirable.15 4 Jus-
tice White, for example, one of the most vociferous advocates of a
good faith exception,155 defended his position by asserting:
The officers [making a reasonable good faith error], if they do their duty, will
act in similar fashion in similar circumstances in the future; and the only
consequence of the rule as presently administrated is that unimpeachable
and probative evidence is kept from the trier of fact and the truth-finding
function of the proceedings is substantially impaired or a trial totally
aborted. 156
Consequently, he concludes, that "[m]aking the arrest in such cir-
cumstance is precisely what the community expects the police of-
ficer to do.''1 57 According to Justice White, therefore, deterring
such behavior is undesirable.
This position reveals the hidden agenda behind the good faith
exception. If the police officer truly acted, under the circum-
stances, in a manner that courts should not deter, why is his be-
havior anything but reasonable? If, then, the search and arrest is
reasonable, it is also constitutional under the fourth amendment.15 8
Rather than merely advocating a good faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule, Justice White is surreptitiously, consciously or uncon-
sciously, disagreeing with the judicial determination that the police
action violates fourth amendment standards. If a violation actually
did take place, even assuming the officer was only reasonably con-
fused and chose to act erroneously, the community still should
have preferred him to have acted otherwise and not to have vio-
lated the constitutional mandate. White's argument lies not with
the remedy but with the judicial determination that a constitu-
tional violation had taken place. He would have chosen to find that
the search was constitutional. Other exception proponents who ar-
gue that the general deterrence of the exclusionary rule is undesir-
the Court then considers correcting the problem by disregarding legitimate claims of right
under the auspices of a good faith exception the court magnifies this irony.
154. The Fifth Circuit, for example, asserted that general deterrence in a good faith
context in undesirable. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 849 (5th Cir. 1980) (en
banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981). See supra text accompanying note 94.
155. Justice White presents his view most completely in Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct.
2317, 2340-47 (1983) (White, J., concurring).
156. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 539.
158. Fourth amendment privacy is not an absolute right, but only a qualified one out-
weighed when governmental intrusion is reasonable. See supra text accompanying note 109.
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able with respect to good faith errors also actually are saying that
the scope of the fourth amendment should be sufficiently narrow
as not to prohibit the police behavior at issue.
Further proof of this observation becomes evident by tracing
the application of Justice White's position in the decisions of other
courts such as Colorado v. Quintero.159 In Quintero the police ar-
rested defendant for theft and possession of a stolen television set.
At the time of the arrest, defendant claimed to have no identifica-
tion and to have purchased the television set from someone in the
neighborhood. The police knew that defendant was a stranger to
the community and had seen him attempt to cover the set with his
shirt. At the time of the arrest, however, no complaints or evidence
established that defendant had committed a crime.160 On the basis
of these facts, the Supreme Court of Colorado found that the of-
ficer had acted without probable cause in arresting and searching
the defendant. According to the court, probable cause to arrest ex-
ists only "when the facts and circumstances within an officer's
knowledge are sufficient to support a reasonable belief that a crime
has been committed by the person arrested." 161
Justice Rovira dissented. He initially argued that the officer's
actions were reasonable and, therefore, constitutional. Only subse-
quently did he assert that a good faith error should not activate
the exclusionary rule, quoting for support Justice White's com-
ment that the officer had acted precisely as the community would
expect.162 Clearly both arguments are the same. According to Jus-
tice Rovira, the court's interpretation of the fourth amendment
standard is too stringent. If no constitutional violation occurred,
then no remedy vindicating the right would be necessary. Justice
Rovira is using the good faith exception covertly to undermine the
claim of right acknowledged by the majority. The opinions of both
Justices White and Rovira illustrate that exception proponents
who argue that the general deterrence of the exclusionary rule is
undesirable with respect to good faith errors actually are saying
that the fourth amendment itself should not prohibit the impli-
cated police behavior. Perhaps the fourth amendment should not.
The issue, however, is one of substantive standards that needs de-
159. 657 P.2d 948, cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3535 (1983), cert. dismissed, 52 U.S.L.W.
3460 (Dec. 13, 1983).
160. The police, in fact, did not learn who owned the television set until more than
five hours after the arrest. Id. at 950.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 952.
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bate and resolution on that level rather than obfuscation and cam-
ouflage in the garb of the seemingly innocuous issue of remedy.
The foregoing discussion sets the stage for a reconsideration of
whether DeFillippo is good precedent for a general good faith ex-
ception.16 The officer in DeFillippo arrested and searched defen-
dant for violating a statute later found unconstitutionally vague.
Chief Justice Burger, ruling the seized contraband admissible,
properly asserted that "[s]ociety would be ill-served if its police
officers took it upon themselves to determine which laws are and
which are not constitutionally entitled to enforcement.1 64 The of-
ficer in DeFillippo acted precisely as the community would wish.
He limited his concern about constitutional rights to the sphere of
police law enforcement. The fourth amendment, however, asserts
that an officer acting unreasonably, without probable cause and a
warrant when necessary, clearly is not acting as the Constitution
requires. Had such an officer acted otherwise, in accordance with
his responsibility under the clause, his choice would be constitu-
tionally preferable and worthy of praise. In DeFillippo, the consti-
tutional error was the legislature's not the officer's, and was not of
fourth amendment origin. The exclusionary rule's justification is to
protect an individual's privacy from unwarranted intrusion; it is
not a remedy for all constitutional violations.1 15 The Court's hold-
ing in DeFillippo is distinguishable from one adopting a general
good faith exception on the basis of differences in the desirability
of general deterrence directed toward police behavior when the
constitutional error is that of the legislature rather than of the of-
ficer. DeFillippo's precedential value for a good faith exception,
thus, is questionable.
The foregoing analysis of general and specific deterrence
reveals that some advocates of the good faith exception utilize a
deterrence rationale which is conceptually flawed. A consideration
of systemic deterrence e1 6 reveals additional shortcomings in the ad-
vocates' concept of deterrence. In addition to its specific and gen-
eral deterrent value, the exclusionary rule also may deter illegal
163. See supra text accompanying notes 96-99.
164. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 38.
165. When a statute forbids leafletting on public streets the police officer's responsibil-
ity is to enforce that law. A court need not exclude the narcotics found on an arrested
leafletter because the statute violates first amendment rights. Other remedies are truly
available for this claim of right violation such as declaring the statute unconstitutional and
reversing any conviction for the statute's breach.
166. "Systemic deterrence" is a construct borrowed from the writings of Mertens and
Wasserstrom, supra note 3, at 399-401.
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police behavior by increasing police officials' awareness of constitu-
tional requirements and their responsibility to abide by them. If
police officials realize the importance of complying with fourth
amendment dictates, they can encourage individual officers to
comply through training and developing departmental guidelines
for searches, seizures, and arrests. 1 7 While individual officers ini-
tially may be hostile toward fourth amendment demands, depart-
mental insistence on respect for such demands likely would reduce
resistance to restrictions that police officers otherwise may view as
illegitimately imposed by authorities external to the police subcul-
ture. The increased use of search warrants, the stepped up devel-
opment of police educational programs, and the creation of ongo-
ing working relationships between police and prosecutors already
reflects the exclusionary rule's potential beneficial effects.16 8
The exclusionary rule, however, also has had a less obvious,
yet more important, systemic impact. Fourth amendment consider-
ations only became part of the national consciousness when courts,
due to the rule, had occasion and incentive to articulate them. The
rhetoric of these decisions slowly acclimated the public to the
fourth amendment values that the decisions defended.169 Police de-
partments, of course, recruit their officers from the general public.
The police today, therefore, are more likely to be sympathetic to
167. Id. at 399. The low visibility of the discretion exercised by lower echelon police
officers may limit the effectiveness of departmental rulemaking. See supra note 139.
168. LaFave, supra note 3, at 319. One Florida prosecutor noted that within his juris-
diction police are forbidden to seek a warrant before a prosecutor reviews their requesting
papers.
169. Rhetoric can be a powerful instrument for change. For years ethnologists study-
ing the relation of language to culture have insisted that any change in language constitutes
an influence on both perception and conception. See, e.g., R. BRowN, I. Copi, D. D. Du-
LANEY, W. FRANKENA, P. HENLE & C. STEVESNSON, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT & CULTURE 1-24
(1958); E. Sapir, Language, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF EDWARD SAPiR IN LANGUAGE, CULTURE
AND PERSONALITY 7-32 (D. Mandelbaum ed. 1949); B. Whorf, The Relation of Habitual
Thought and Behavior to Language, in LANGUAGE, CULTURE AND PERSONALITY: ESSAYS IN
MEMORY OF EDWARD SAP R 75-93 (L. Spier, A. Hallowell & S. Newman eds. 1941). Edward
Sapir, an early leader in ethnology wrote:
The relation between language and experience is often misunderstood. Language is not
merely a more or less systematic inventory of the various items of experience which
seem relevant to the individual, as is so often naively assumed, but is also a self-con-
tained, creative symbolic organization, which not only refers to experience largely ac-
quired without its help but actually defines experience for us by reasons of its formal
completeness and because of our unconscious projection of its implicit expectation into
the field of experience.
E. Sapir, Conceptual Categories in Primitive Languages, in LANGUAGE IN CULTURE AND So-
cETY 128 (D. Hymes ed. 1964). Rhetoric thus may grease the wheels of ideological change.
See generally Ingber, supra note 145, at 268-73.
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fourth amendment values then were their pre-exclusionary rule
predecessors.
Some critics of the exclusionary rule, however, claim that the
lack of a good faith exception reduces rather than enhances the
potential of systemic deterrence. They argue that departments
which attempt to educate their officers but still find evidence ex-
cluded due to further development or change in judicial interpreta-
tion may adopt an attitude that "the courts cannot be satisfied,
that the rules are hopelessly complicated and subject to change,
and that the suppression of evidence is [thus] the courts' problem
and not the departments'. ' 170 Such frustration may discourage a
department from even trying to educate its officers to avoid fourth
amendment violations.
This assertion is similar to the objection of tort defendants
that the law does not give sufficient direction as how to avoid lia-
bility.171 A jury determination that the defendant failed to act in a
reasonable, prudent manner, indeed, provides little guidance as to
what behavior would have been sufficient. Even a finding of no lia-
bility leaves the defendant and those in similar situations wonder-
ing whether he was more cautious than required.
This vagueness in tort law, however, is socially valuable. While
violation of a known or knowable standard of conduct makes moral
reproach and punishment more justified, 72 tort law does not focus
on individual moral responsibility. 173 Tort law functions not to
earmark personal culpability, but to continuously press societal
members to make choices that will lower the risk of injury and
pain.17 4 Legally fixing the duty of an individual in a particular con-
170. Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1050. See J. SKOLNICK, supra note 61, at 212-29.
171. Justice Holmes enthusiastically supported the movement to define more stably
the responsibility of both tort defendants and plaintiffs. Baltimore & 0. R.R. Co. v. Good-
man, 275 U.S. 66 (1927); Lorenzo v. Wirth, 170 Mass. 596, 49 N.E. 1010 (1897).
172. Consequently, the state must have given the defendant in a criminal trial fair
notice at the time of his offense of the standards of criminal liability. Criminal law equates
individual moral culpability and accountability. The law justifies punishment only if the
wrongdoer deserves some measure of societal approbrium. As the text suggests, violation of
a known or knowable standard of conduct makes such a societal response more appropriate.
173. The widespread use of liability insurance, which associates risks with activities
rather than with individuals, clearly indicates a concern other than individual accountabil-
ity. Furthermore, courts hold mentally limited individuals to a standard of care even when
they can demonstrate their personal inability to function at the required level. Vaughan v.
Menlove, 3 Bing. 468 (N.C. Ct. Comm. Pleas 1837). Clearly, moral responsibility is not the
crucial issue.
174. The use of tort law to reduce the costs of accidents is discussed in G. CALnREs1,
THE CosTs OF AccmE-NTs 26-28 (1970). See also Ingber, Defamation: A Conflict Between
Reason and Decency. 65 VA. L. REv. 785, 812-33 (1979).
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text and steadfastly refusing to change that duty removes the need
to strive to develop better ways of avoiding injuries. Legally fixed
duties, thus, would retard the valuable evolution of tort law.
The exclusionary rule's application to fourth amendment vio-
lations serves the same type of socially valuable function as tort
law. The rule's purpose is not to punish culpable officers, but to
structure a criminal justice system with incentives for police to
strive continuously to respect more fully, rather than to violate,
constitutional norms.175 Yet the desire of police departments that
courts fix and do not change fourth amendment standards repre-
sents the improper view that the exclusionary rule's purpose is to
punish the culpable officer. If the legal system encourages police
departments always to improve and more fully to respect constitu-
tional values, then systemic deterrence more likely will result. The
articulation by courts of fixed and unchanging constitutional stan-
dards, given the pressure of the police role, likely will convert con-
stitutional minimums into institutional maximums. Likewise, a
good faith exception will encourage departments not to counsel or
advise their officers to give any more consideration for fourth
amendment rights than existing case law absolutely mandates. 1 6
The good faith exception, therefore, is inconsistent with the goal of
systemic deterrence.
While the exclusionary rule clearly has deterrent potential,
measuring the general and systemic deterrent value of the rule is
likely impossible. No statistics reveal the number of unlawful
searches that the rule has deterred. But empirical evidence of the
rule's deterrent effect is no weaker than evidence of the deterrent
effect of laws, for example, against larceny. 7 7 As Professor Dwor-
175. Professor Amsterdam analogizes the exclusionary rule to police sponsored anti-
theft programs that brand personal property. Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 431-32. Identifi-
cation marks diminish the property's value to a prospective thief because he knows it will be
more difficult to sell the goods at a worthwhile price. Although these identification programs
do not influence those who steal for excitement, revenge, or personal use, diminishing the
property's worth correspondingly decreases the motivation to steal it.
176. A tension, of course, exists between the need for "bright line" decisions offering
police guidance, see supra text accompanying notes 151-53, and the value of ever change-
able standards encouraging police departments to review continuously and to strive for im-
provement in their procedures. Bright lines demand court decisions that are not excessively
fact bound. As argued earlier, however, not all bright lines are equally defensible. See supra
note 152. Conflicts over where the courts should draw the line would continue to assure the
flexibility of fourth amendment doctrine necessary to encourage continued systemic
deterrence.
177. Some writers suggest the case supporting the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect
is the stronger of the two. E.g., Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 431.
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kin observed: "Deterrence is partly a matter of logic and psychol-.
ogy, largely a matter of faith. The question is never whether laws
do deter, but rather whether conduct ought to be deterred. .. .
Certainly, then, the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule de-
serves as much respect as does the deterrent value of the criminal
'law generally.
C. The Good Faith Exception's Effect on the Scope of the
Fourth Amendment
Thus far this Article has shown how the exclusionary rule both
offers appropriate vindication for fourth amendment violations and
has deterrent value. Its critics, therefore, only can argue that the
rule adversely affects the police's ability to fight crime. Accord-
ingly, this section discusses these alleged adverse effects while de-
veloping insights into the good faith exception's effect on the scope
of the fourth amendment.
A portion of society perceives the exclusionary rule as ham-
stringing police and allowing guilty defendants to go unpunished.
Statistical studies, however, suggest this perception is faulty. First
while the exclusionary rule only functions to suppress evidence at
trial, our criminal justice system focuses more on obtaining guilty
pleas than on securing convictions at trial. Seventy to ninety per-
cent of prosecuted cases result in guilty pleas.179 The criminal jus-
tice system probably will not notice any police misconduct in these
cases.180 One plausible interpretation of such statistics is that they
show only that prosecutors screen out and never prosecute a signi-
ficant number of cases that contain illegal searches and seizures.
Another study, however, refutes this interpretation. After monitor-
ing felony case processing in five cities, the study found that due
process violations, including but not limited to fourth amendment
violations, accounted for one (1) to nine (9) percent of the cases
rejected through prosecutor screening.181 "While it may be that po-
178. Dworkin, supra note 61, at 333.
179. Y. KAMiAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 22 (5th ed.
1980); Allen, Central Problems of American Criminal Justice, 75 MIcH. L. REV. 813, 819
(1977).
180. Police misconduct often may go unnoticed even by defense counsel who may
spend only enough time with his client to ask whether or not the client is guilty. One study
in which public defenders represented defendants, for example, indicated that 30% of the
defendants reported their attorney spent less than 10 minutes with them; 32% stated 10 to
29 minutes; 27% stated one-half hour to 3 hours; and only 14% stated more than 3 hours. J.
CASPER, CRIMINAL CouRTs: THE DEFENDANTS PERSPECTIVE IV (1978) (abstract).
181. Brosi, A Cross-City Comparison of Felony Case Processing 18-19 (1979). Groups
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lice do not arrest some suspects because of search and seizure limi-
tations," the report concluded, "these percentages seem to counter
the conventional wisdom that Supreme Court decisions cause
many arrests to fail because of technicalities. . .. In felony cases
other than drugs, less than 2% of the rejections in each city in-
volved abrogation of due process.118 2 While the exclusionary rule's
effect on the government's decisions to prosecute appears
deminimus, its effect upon trial outcomes is even smaller. The
same Comptroller General's study that Justice White cited in
Gates to support a good faith exception s noted that of the 2,804
defendants charged in thirty-eight United States attorney offices
during a two month period only 30% of the cases included a search
or seizure and only 11% of the defendants filed motions to sup-
press. Courts denied these motions in the overwhelming majority
of cases, so that in only 1.3 % of the sampled criminal cases did the
courts actually exclude evidence.184 Furthermore, over half of the
cases in which the court granted the motion to suppress still re-
sulted in conviction.' 5
Even though these statistics belie the popular impression that
the exclusionary rule severely undermines law enforcement, the
rule's supporters cannot disregard the existence of popular mis-
perception. Institutional legitimacy is a matter of perception
whether or not the perception is correct. If the exclusionary rule's
interference with police work even in a small number of cases sig-
nificantly undermines public confidence in the criminal justice sys-
tem, the rule is a fitting subject of concern. Consequently, the ac-
tual relationship between the exclusionary rule and limitations on
police behavior needs exploration.
Soon after Mapp extended the exclusionary rule to state crim-
inal proceedings, New York City Police Commissioner Murphy
wrote an article complaining:
I can think of no decision in recent times in the field of law enforcement
which had such a dramatic and traumatic effect as this .... I was immedi-
ately caught up in the entire program of reevaluating our procedures ...
such as the U.S. Department of Justice and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administra-
tion commissioned the study.
182. Id. at 19. Prosecutors encounter search and seizure problems most commonly in
crimes, such as possession of narcotics, that lack traditional complainants. See supra note
45.
183. See supra note 48.
184. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, IMPACT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION II (Apr. 19, 1979).
185. Id. at 13.
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modifying, amending, and creating new polices and new instructions for the
implementation of Mapp . . . . Retraining sessions had to be held from the
very top administrators down to each of the thousands of foot
patrolmen. . ... 86
Obviously Mapp caused New York police to consider dramatic be-
havior changes. But why such dramatic changes proved necessary
is unclear. Fourth amendment standards should have limited New
York police since the Wolf decision, which preceded Mapp by
twelve years.'8s Mapp merely changed the remedy for violations;
the decision should not have changed the substantive standards of
the fourth amendment with which police already were required to
comply. Police Commissioner Murphy's statement demonstrates
that, prior to the implementation of the exclusionary rule, police
departments were indifferent to fourth amendment restrictions on
police conduct and that the suppression doctrine does have sys-
temic deterrent value.
The contention that the exclusionary rule "handcuffs" police
is simply wrong.' Rather than the remedy chosen to vindicate vi-
olated fourth amendment rights, the interpreted scope of the
fourth amendment itself mandates actual limitations on police
conduct.8 9 Consequently, the public's perception that the exclu-
sionary rule hamstrings police in fulfilling their crime fighting re-
186. Murphy, Judicial Review of Police Methods in Law Enforcement: The Problem
of Compliance by Police Departments, 44 Tax. L. REv. 939, 941 (1966).
187. See supra text accompanying note 26.
188. The assertion that the exclusionary rule allows the criminal to go free because the
constable has blundered is misleading. Such as assertion implies that had the constable been
more careful the court would have convicted the criminal. Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra
note 3, at 366 n.5. Often, however, this is not the case. If the officer, lacking probable cause
to arrest or search, abided by fourth amendment dictates, the criminal still would have gone
free because no arrest or search would have taken place. In such contexts the constable
must have blundered for any prosecution to occur at all.
189. As long also as 1938 Senator Robert Wagner of New York noted before his state's
constitutional convention that the right, rather than the remedy, mandates police restraint-
All the argument [that the exclusionary rule will handicap law enforcement] seems to
me to be properly directed not against the exclusionary rule but against the substantive
guarantee itself.... It is the [law of search and seizure], not the sanction, which im-
poses limits on the operation of the police. If the [law of search and seizure] is obeyed
as it should be, and as we declare it should be, there will be no illegally obtained evi-
dence to be excluded by the operation of the sanction.
... It seems to me inconsistent to challenge the exclusionary rule on the ground
that it will hamper the police, while making no challenge to the fundamental rules to
which the police are required to conform.
1 New York Constitutional Convention, Revised Record 560 (1938), reprinted in J.
MICHAEL & H. WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 1191-92 (1940). See Oaks,
supra note 3, at 754.
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sponsibility is not only statistically but also conceptually
incorrect.19
Furthermore, an internal analytical inconsistency exists in
condemning the exclusionary rule on the one hand for not deter-
ring police misconduct and on the other for hamstringing police in
their crime fighting efforts. If the courts chose an alternative
fourth amendment remedy that more effectively deterred illegal
searches and seizures, then the same or even a greater number of
guilty individuals would go free, because without such arrests and
searches police would discover even less evidence upon which pros-
ecutors could base conviction191 or gain a guilty plea. Presently, for
example, a defendant's lack of standing to protest the admission of
incriminating evidence obtained in violation of someone else's pri-
vacy right allows some use of illegally seized evidence at trial.192 If
a different remedy more effectively had deterred the offending of-
ficer, he would not have committed the illegal search, he would not
have found the incriminating evidence, and the defendant more
likely would have avoided conviction. Consequently, a remedy
more efficient at deterring illegal police behavior than the exclu-
sionary rule as presently applied also would restrict more severely
the police's ability to gain convictions.1 93
In addition to the loss of evidence that contributes to convic-
tions and guilty pleas, the police no longer would make many
searches that presently serve to recover stolen goods and confiscate
contraband. Nor could they respond as easily to community de-
mands for increased enforcement. Consequently, replacement of
the exclusionary rule with a more effective police deterrent greatly
would impede some practices law enforcement officers presently
find beneficial in controlling crime.19"
190. One critic of the exclusionary rule credits it with the defeat of effective gun con-
trol law. See Wilkey, supra note 3, at 224. But the fourth amendment itself, not the exclu-
sionary rule, prevents police from searching anyone with a bulging pocket. Furthermore, no
reason exists to believe that the community's criminal element refrained from carrying guns
until the Court decided Mapp in 1961.
191. This argument assumes that police could not find alternative means to obtain
evidence. If legal alternatives did exist, however, and the police still acted illegally, release
of criminals would not be a product of overly restrictive constitutional standards but of
police ineptness.
192. See supra note 91.
193. Evidence also would not be available for impeachment purposes or for submission
to a grand jury. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
194. Society, in fact, may saddle police with performing tasks that it wants accom-
plished but not condoned. Professor Paul Chevigny suggests that:
For legislators and judges the police are a godsend, because all the acts of oppres-
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The ramifications of adopting a more effective remedy there-
fore would be extensive. 195 Because police would make no unlawful
searches or arrests, many crimes would appear totally unsolved. Al-
though courts would free fewer defendants on what the public per-
ceives as legal technicalities, a reduction would occur in the overt
demonstration of police capability, for example, to solve crime, to
protect the public, and to retrieve stolen property. The more effec-
tive remedy could result in increased public satisfaction with the
visible functioning of the courts and decreased approval of the visi-
ble functioning of the police. The courts would appear to be deal-
ing effectively with those prosecuted; by contrast, the police would
appear as unequal to the task of apprehending criminals deserving
prosecution.
Obviously, public dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule oc-
curs because the rule functions after an unlawful arrest or search
already publicly has unveiled a wrongdoer. The rule, thus, openly
flaunts the price of the fourth amendment;""8 in fact, it "rubs our
noses in it. ' 197 Critics of the exclusionary rule, thus, in reality are
critics of the fourth amendment itself. They apparently believe
that sufficient discredit of the rule could lead to judicial interpre-
tations either further limiting the rule's scope or replacing it with a
less, rather than a more, effective remedy.198 A forthright demand
for a less effective remedy clearly would focus the resulting conflict
not on the remedy for illegal intrusions of privacy by police, but on
whether the law should deem illegal and deter such intrusions at
all. This demand thereby would entail a frontal attack on the val-
sion that must be performed in this society to keep it running smoothly are pushed
upon the police. The police get the blame, and the officials stay free of the stigma of
approving their highhanded acts. The police have become the repository of all the illib-
eral impulses in this liberal society; they are under heavy fire because most of us no
longer admit so readily to our illiberal impulses as we once did.
P. CHEVIGNY, POLICE PowER 280 (1969).
195. Imagine, for example, an effective tort remedy that required police officers violat-
ing the fourth amendment to assume significant individual damage liability. If, as exclusion-
ary rule critics argue, fourth amendment doctrine is intolerably obscure, officers wishing to
protect themselves and their families from financial hardship would be fearful of making
arrests and searches that even arguably may be improper. Courts, however, upon formal
review might find proper many of such chilled searches. An effective tort remedy, conse-
quently, may chill the legally justified searches now occurring under the exclusionary rule.
196. J. KAPLAN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 215-16 (1978).
197. Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1037.
198. Even Professor Oaks recognized that the argument concerning the exclusionary
rule's "handcuffing" police put the rule's critics in the "untenable position of urging that the
sanction be abolished so that [police] can continue to violate [constitutional] rules with im-
punity." Oaks, supra note 3, at 754.
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ues embodied in the fourth amendment itself.
A frontal attack on the fourth amendment, however, is diffi-
cult because the Bill of Rights has held an almost mystical position
in American heritage. Accepting fourth amendment values in the
abstract, while whittling away their importance by developing ex-
ceptions to the remedy, avoids the blasphemy of an overt challenge
to such values. Avoiding such blasphemy, in turn, increases the
chances of societal acceptance of reductions in the fourth amend-
ment's scope and significance."9
Avoiding a blatant attack on the fourth amendment while re-
ducing the significance of the rights it embodies would be the ef-
fect, if not the purpose, of a good faith exception. The attack is
upon the citadel of the fourth amendment rather than simply upon
the exclusionary rule. Consequently, when courts entertain adopt-
ing a good faith exception, they should consider how the exception
actually retards the development and restricts the scope of the
fourth amendment rather than the more comfortable issue of
whether the rule has any deterrent value in specific situations. In
anticipation of this evaluation, this Article now will demonstrate
how the proposed exception is a subtle and, consequently, highly
dangerous attack on the viability of the fourth amendment.
1. Retarding Fourth Amendment Development
A good faith exception will either slow or freeze fourth amend-
ment development "dead in its tracks."200 Under such an exception
evidence obtained by a police officer when acting upon a reasona-
ble good faith belief that his conduct was lawful is admissible
whether or not his behavior was, or was not, constitutional. Conse-
quently, the preliminary issue of judicial concern will be whether
the officer acted under such a reasonable good faith belief. When a
court finds the existence of such a belief, the actual constitutional-
ity of the officer's behavior, thus, becomes irrelevant. Courts using
199. A literary example of the procedure's use as a tool of conflict settlement that
conceals disagreements of substantive values is Shirley Jackson's short story, The Lottery,
in THE LOTTERY 291 (1949). The society Jackson describes in her story has no predilection
against individual sacrifice for collective goals. In fact, the society prefers such an arrange-
ment. The story describes a communal ceremony wherein lots are drawn to determine whom
the community will stone to death for some unspecified community need. Although the
eventual winner of the lottery objects, she couches her objection in terms of proce-
dure-that the lots were drawn too quickly-rather than in terms of the substance of the
activity. Id. at 299.
200. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 554 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See
LaFave, supra note 3, at 354-55.
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the good faith exception, therefore, will have no need to further
develop or refine fourth amendment doctrine.2 0 1 No articulation of
the appropriate rule of conduct that police and courts should fol-
low in future situations will be forthcoming; thus, no general or
systemic deterrence will ensue. If, in fact, the officer's behavior was
unconstitutional, nothing will prevent that officer or others from
continuing to make the same good faith error in the future.
Justice White, in his Gates concurrence, rejected the inevita-
bility of this outcome if the Court adopted the good faith excep-
tion. He insisted that if a fourth amendment case presented a
novel situation in which a court had to decide the constitutionality
of an officer's behavior in order to provide guidance for his and
others' future actions, the court would have sufficient reason to de-
cide whether a violation had occurred before turning to the good
faith question.2"2
Both constitutional precedent and prudential considerations,
however, suggest that this advisory opinion procedure advocated
by Justice White is not likely to occur.101 Consider, for example,
the Supreme Court's response to the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Bowen v. United States.0 4 While refusing to retroactively apply
the standards articulated in Almeida-Sanchez for roving border
patrol searches, 05 the Ninth Circuit first found the challenged
search illegal under those standards. 208 The Supreme Court agreed
that retroactive application was not necessary but then warned,
This Court consistently has declined to address unsettled questions regarding
the scope of decisions establishing new constitutional doctrine in cases in
which it holds those decisions nonretroactive .... This practice is rooted in
our reluctance to decide constitutional questions unnecessarily .... Because
this reluctance is in turn grounded in the constitutional role of the federal
courts ... the district courts and courts of appeal should follow our practice,
when issues of both retroactivity and application of constitutional doctrine
201. Justice Brennan observed that if, under a general good faith exception, evidence
is admissible unless clear precedent, not subject to reasonable misinterpretation, declares
the search in question unconstitutional, "the first duty of a court will be to deny the ac-
cused's motion to suppress if he cannot cite a case invalidating a search or seizure on identi-
cal facts." Peltier, 422 U.S. at 554.
202. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2346.
203. Whether Justice White would wish such a procedure actually to develop is not
clear. Within the same paragraph discussed in the text, he observes that: "It is not entirely
clear to me that the law in this area has benefited from the constant pressure of fully-
litigated suppression motions." Id.
204. 422 U.S. 916 (1975).
205. For a discussion of Almeida-Sanchez, see supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
206. United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974).
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are raised, of deciding the retroactivity issue first."°
Even assuming the Court did not mean literally that Article III
limitations prohibit a court from addressing such constitutional is-
sues, prudential considerations alone probably would lead most
courts first to decide the good faith issue and, thus, avoid unneces-
sary judicial interference in effective law enforcement. °s
Even assuming Justice White's position ultimately proves cor-
rect, however, recognition of a good faith exception still would re-
strict severely fourth amendment development. According to the
Justice's theory, courts could articulate new fourth amendment
standards while refusing to exclude evidence in a particular case
because the officer reasonably could not have anticipated the
change. But if a good faith error does not lead to suppression of
the illegally obtained evidence, a defense attorney would have little
incentive to make the new and creative argument that might sup-
port recognition of a new standard. Criminal defense counsels try
to make argnnents that immediately benefit their clients rather
than to urge abstract and conceptual points of law for the future
benefit of others. 0 9 Proposing radically new approaches or consid-
erations in search and seizure cases would not further criminal de-
fense strategy. Consequently, defense counsels are not likely to ar-
gue cases that raise a good faith exception at a level that would
allow Justice White's theory to function.2 10
207. Peltier, 422 U.S. at 920 (emphasis added).
208. Some jurists forthrightly have acknowledged this fact. "It is no sufficient objec-
tion that [a good faith exception] would require courts to make still another determination"
writes Judge Henry Friendly. "[R]ather, the recognition of a penumbral zone where mistake
will not call for the drastic remedy of exclusion would relieve them of exceedingly difficult
decisions whether an officer overstepped the sometimes almost imperceptible line between a
valid arrest or search and an invalid one." Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 929, 953 (1965).
209. Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 3, at 451. In response to this concern, Justice
White proposed allowing application of a new fourth amendment standard to the party in
whose case the rule is first announced. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2347 n.19. Depending
upon the interpretation of the Justice's proposal, one of two flaws is obvious. If the Justice
means that newly announced fourth amendment rules will not receive general retroactive
application, this is already the case, see United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982), and a
good faith exception adds nothing. If he means to motivate attorneys to make new argu-
ments by permitting exclusion of evidence for some but not all good faith errors, determin-
ing which errors should lead to suppression becomes a matter of judicial whim rather than
fairness to law enforcement authorities. That very fairness to police, however, is the precise
rationale allegedly justifying the exception. Thus, under this interpretation Justice White's
proposal undercuts the exception's validity.
210. An alternative scenario is possible. A good faith exception might result in endless
judicial debate over whether an officer should have anticipated a specific interpretation of
the law. What constitutes a "reasonable mistake of law" is exceedingly difficult to deter-
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In the past the exclusionary rule has functioned to assure that
courts' continually reassess and refine fourth amendment protec-
tions. 11 Some procedure must exist that allows courts to review
claims of right and articulate constitutional doctrine.212 A good
faith exception severely would reduce the need of courts to con-
sider and adopt new fourth amendment standards. Stripped of this
responsibility to develop new standards 213 or subtly refine those al-
ready recognized,1 4 the courts no longer will offer the guidance
necessary for general or systemic deterrence of behavior that vio-
lates the fourth amendment.21 5 Without systematic deterrence, of
course, the importance of and respect for the fourth amendment in
this society gradually will diminish.
Previously, this Article presented United States v. Peltier as
possible precedential support for a general good faith exception.1 6
The above discussion, however, provides the analysis necessary to
distinguish Peltier. The Peltier court simply refused to apply ret-
mine. Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1044. Cf. Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 357, 530 P.2d 589,
593 (1975) (finding malpractice when attorney failed to perform adequate research to advise
his client on an uncertain point of law); Smith v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 366 F.
Supp. 1283 (M.D. La. 1973) (courts uneasy about finding that an attorney has malpracticed
when failing to anticipate changes in the law). Instead of a forthright confrontation over
what standards should exist, judicial attention would be focused upon the meaning of prior
decisions articulating prior standards. This scenario, consequently, also would impede
fourth amendment development.
211. See Oaks, supra note 3, at 756.
212. Although Wolf in 1949 declared that the fourth amendment bound the states, no
court cases attempted to determine the contour of the states' responsibility under the Con-
stitution until after Mapp imposed the exclusionary rule on the states in 1961.
213. If the fourth amendment standard proposed at trial differs dramatically from or
fills a gap in prior fourth amendment doctrine, the officer reasonably could claim a good
faith error. If evidence is then admissible, the court need not decide whether the officer's
conduct is constitutionally improper. Under such an exception the Court would not have
had a chance to decide the following landmark decisions, which dramatically deviated from
prior case law: Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648
(1979); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967);
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
214. If the officer's behavior in a specific case is objectionable only if the court makes
subtle distinctions from prior case law, the officer again may claim a reasonable good faith
error. Doctrinal contours thus will remain unclear if courts have no opportunity or incentive
to refine doctrine through the process of repeated application. Yet, scholars traditionally
deem this type of development highly appropriate for judicial institutions. Levi, An Intro-
duction to Legal Reasoning, reprinted in G. CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE 964 (1963). But see
supra note 176 and text accompanying notes 151-53.
215. Exposure to flesh and blood cases, which force courts to learn experientially,
properly discourage courts from relying on rarefied abstractions. A good faith exception
would diminish such valuable exposure. See O.W. HOLMEs, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Howe ed.
1963) ("The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.").
216. See supra text accompanying notes 95-98.
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roactively a fourth amendment standard newly articulated in Al-
meida-Sanchez. Cases such as Peltier that acknowledge the exis-
tence of newly articulated constitutional standards, but then refuse
to apply them retroactively21 do not impede the development of
constitutional doctrine and do not destroy the general and sys-
temic deterrence provided by the new standards. Rather, such
cases encourage novel and creative approaches by reducing the so-
cietal cost of judicial acceptance of new constitutional standards.
Consequently, the ramifications of non-retroactivity decisions and
of a good faith exception are considerably different. Given such
different effects, Peltier is unconvincing precedential support for a
good faith exception.
2. Erosion of Fourth Amendment Doctrine
Besides retarding fourth amendment development and dimin-
ishing the general and systemic deterrence of fourth amendment
standards, the good faith exception also would erode the fourth
amendment's already articulated substantive doctrines. Consider,
for example, its effect on the requirement of probable cause. Prob-
able cause is the linchpin of fourth amendment protection for it
marks the point at which the qualified individual right to privacy
must succumb to the community's need for security and law en-
forcement. Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts as known
would lead a reasonably cautious individual to believe that the per-
son police are to arrest has or is committing an offense.218 The law
requires the same quantum of evidence before it authorizes a full
search except the conclusions are somewhat different. Probable
cause for a search requires a reasonable belief that the items
sought relate to criminal activity and that police will find the items
at a specific time in the place the police are to search.219 A finding
of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search, thus, does not
require certainty but merely the reasonableness of the officer's or,
in the case of a warrant, the magistrate's belief. The concept of
probable cause, therefore, already subsumes the possibility of a
reasonable error.
Consequently, for a court to find that a police officer or magis-
217. See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384
U.S. 719 (1966); Tehan v. United States ex rel Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966); Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
218. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160 (1949).
219. Y. KAMISAa, W. LAFAvF & J. ISRAEL, supra note 179, at 268.
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trate lacked probable cause it must believe that the specific arrest
or search was unreasonable. If a court applied the reasonable good
faith exception under these circumstances, it necessarily would
have to determine whether the offending official, who admittedly
held an unreasonable belief that probable cause existed, had a rea-
sonable good faith belief that probable cause did exist. The para-
dox is evident: how can one reasonably believe an unreasonable be-
lief? Applying the reasonable good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule in this context clearly requires a determination
that the official acted reasonably, with probable cause, in the first
place.2 20 Thus, courts using such an exception would be imposing
covertly a far more permissive interpretation of probable cause.
Once again, the exception is reducing the scope of the fourth
amendment's already articulated standards rather than merely
providing an innocuous exception to the remedy chosen to vindi-
cate fourth amendment rights.
3. Interfering With the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
The good faith exception also would subtly and insidiously
erode the importance and effectiveness of the sixth amendment
right to counsel. Ever since the early 1960's, the Supreme Court
has recognized that the aid of counsel in a criminal trial is essential
to ensure both a fair trial2 21 and proper protection of the individ-
ual liberty interests at stake.222 The defense attorney, then, as well
as the prosecution, is crucial to society's adversarial system of
criminal justice. In a 1963 report by the Attorney General's Com-
mittee on Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Jus-
tice 223 the Committee recognized that,
The essence of the adversary system is challenge. The survival of our system
of criminal justice and the values which it advances depend upon a constant,
searching, and creative questioning of official decisions and assertions of au-
thority at all stages of the process. The proper performance of the defense
function is thus as vital to the health of the system as the performance of the
220. Consequently, the dissent in People v. Quintero, as argued previously, see supra
text accompanying notes 159-62, is attacking the majority's determination that probable
cause for a search did not exist.
221. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
222. Scott v. Illinois; 440 U.S. 367 (1979), held that a court only need grant counsel to
a defendant on trial for a misdemeanor if, upon conviction, the court in fact sentenced him
to a period of incarceration. The Supreme Court found that defendants only sentenced to
fines have no such constitutional right. See also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
223. Commentators often refer to the report as The Allen Report, after the Chairman
of the Committee, Professor Francis A. Allen.
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prosecuting and adjudicatory functions. 22'
The defense attorney, thus, is valuable not merely because he en-
sures a fair trial and protects his client's liberty interests, but also
because he provides the open criticism and analysis of governmen-
tal behavior necessary for a healthy criminal justice system. While
defending his client, he also exposes governmental improprieties
and, thus, aids in the control of the controllers.225
Seemingly, therefore, defendant's sixth amendment right to
counsel concerns more than the presence or appointment of some-
one labeled "defense counsel"; the individual so labeled also must
function effectively as counsel. Ineffective counsel may result ei-
ther from lack of attorney diligence or from a system structured to
prevent defendants from benefitting from attorneys' efforts.
Over twenty years ago Justice Douglas spoke of a criminal de-
fendant's right to have and benefit from the efforts of an "imagina-
tive lawyer. ' 228 A good faith exception would diminish such a right.
If an imaginative lawyer has not convinced any prior court that a
new fourth amendment standard is necessary, the offending officer
in a given case only need claim that he in good faith did not antici-
pate the proposed perspective in order to deprive defense counsel
of any opportunity to bring a creative and imaginative argument to
the court's attention.22 7 If the officer acted in good faith the evi-
dence would remain admissible. No matter how capable and con-
vincing is defense counsel's presentation, the good faith exception
will deprive defendant of the benefit of his attorney's argument
unless prior defendants had equally capable counsel. 228 Defendants
should not need to rely on anyone other than their own attorney
for vindication of their constitutional rights. A system that re-
224. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINIS-
TRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1963), reprinted in Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE & J.
ISRAEL, supra note 179, at 53.
225. Some jurists and scholars reject this system regulation role of defense counsel and
advise a more complete focus on the criminal justice system's truth-finding function. Fran-
kel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1055 (1975). Crimi-
nal law, thus, would seek to control only the potential deviant. For a discussion of the law's
need also to control the controllers, see supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
226. Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443, 447 (1962).
227. As previously asserted, defense counsel will have no incentive to develop or pro-
pose new and creative arguments that do not inure to his client's benefit. See supra notes
209-10 and accompanying text.
228. In fact a danger exists of an infinite recursion, in which an officer's claim of good
faith error defeats defense counsel's arguments, which courts in turn similarly had dismissed
on good faith grounds when raised in earlier cases. This process would prevent further de-
velopment of the law.
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quires otherwise interferes with the fundamental right to counsel.
A conceptual critique of the good faith exception, thus, reveals
that the exception is premised erroneously on the inability of the
exclusionary rule to deter illegal police behavior in good faith error
circumstances and ignores that a constitutional violation goes un-
remedied. Further, as this Article has shown, the very premise of
the exception is faulty because it neglects the general and systemic
effects of the rule in good faith error contexts. More significantly,
however, recognition of the exception severely would restrict the
scope of the fourth amendment and potentially would freeze fur-
ther development of fourth amendment standards. Additionally,
while the exception's adverse effect on the sixth amendment right
to effective counsel is subtle, the effect is substantial. All these fac-
tors make a strong conceptual case against recognition of a good
faith exception. The practical problems associated with implemen-
tation of the exception, however, also are extensive and require
exploration.
IV. THE DIFFIcULTIES AssOCIATED WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF A
GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
The practical problems associated with implementation of a
good faith exception should be sufficient to discourage its adop-
tion. The judicial process used to determine whether a court
should apply the exception will diminish the importance and scope
of the fourth amendment as well as encourage police to manipulate
the criminal justice system.
A. Defining Reasonable Good Faith
The proposed good faith exception has both a subjective and
objective component. The subjective component requires an officer
honestly to believe his actions lawful. Since the primary justifica-
tion for the exception is the exclusionary rule's inability to deter
an officer who mistakenly regards his behavior as constitutional,
the subjective aspect of "good faith" lies at the heart of the excep-
tion. The objective component, the requirement that the error be
reasonable, attempts to avoid placing a premium on ignorance and
poor training. Without the objective aspect, protection from gov-
ernmental intrusion would be no greater than that observed by the
least knowledgeable and least diligent member of the law enforce-
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ment team.2 2 ' Both the subjective and objective components, how-
ever, pose extensive problems that require discussion.
The following hypothetical provides a basis for illustrating the
difficulties associated with the good faith exception's subjective
component. Assume the existence of an area of search and seizure
law that courts have not defined clearly and that lacks authorita-
tive determination by the Supreme Court.23 0 Given the law's un-
certain condition, reasonable individuals could disagree whether
certain police behavior is legal in a specific context. Assume that
an officer confronts a situation within this nebulous area, and that
he reasonably and in good faith believes a search would be legal,
performs the search, and discovers illegal drugs. Another officer
confronts the identical situation. He, in contrast to the first officer,
reasonably believes a search would be illegal..23  He, however, per-
forms the search and also uncovers illegal drugs. A court, reviewing
the second officer's behavior and recognizing the officer's bad faith,
will eliminate any good faith assertion and find the officer's behav-
ior unconstitutional.3 2 Consequently, the court will exclude the
drugs at the second defendant's trial. At the first defendant's trial,
however, the same court, reviewing the first officer's behavior and
recognizing that the officer reasonably believed his behavior was
legal, will admit the drugs into evidence. Therefore, although both
defendants have had their fourth amendment rights violated in
precisely the same manner, under a system recognizing a good
faith exception the same court will vindicate one defendant's vio-
lated right while allowing the other's to go unremedied. ss
These incongruent results, mandated by the good faith excep-
tion, pose two immediate problems. First the inconsistent treat-
229. "A proper legal definition of 'good faith' involves not only a lack of malevolence
but also a reasonable effort to comply with the law." Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass.
488, -, 441 N.E.2d 725, 738 (1982) (Liacos, J., concurring). See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S.
Ct. 2317, 2340-47 (White, J., concurring).
230. For example, the extent to which police may use the "drug courier profile" to
justify a forcible stop, search, and seizure is an area of law that similarly lacks authoritative
determination by the Court. See Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983); Reid v. Georgia,
448 U.S. 438 (1980); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
231. Each officer's respective police department may have trained him: one to view
such behavior as lawful, the other to view it as improper. Again, both departments would be
interpreting the law reasonably although they disagree.
232. Of course, this assumes the court could overcome the evidentiary difficulty that
finding subjective bad faith entails. See infra text accompanying notes 242-54.
233. Thus, the argument that the officers' different motivations justify different reme-
dies is untenable. No alternative remedy exists for an individual whose rights police violated
while acting on the basis of a good faith error. See supra text accompanying notes 141-44.
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ment of two identically culpable defendants whose fundamental
rights police violated 23 4 in the same exact way is intuitively dis-
comforting. In such a situation the importance of fourth amend-
ment norms seems unverified and the public's perception of courts
acting as defenders of the faith, protectors of constitutional liber-
ties, is severely shaken. Furthermore, a court's failure to follow the
principle insisting that it treat like situations alike will violate the
public's expectation of proper judicial functioning.3" Justice
Harlan recognized the importance of this principle nearly fifteen
years ago in his Desist v. United States dissent.236 In Desist, the
Court refused to apply the new fourth amendment standard ar-
ticulated in Katz v. United States,23 7 which required a warrant for
telephone taps, to cases in which police misbehavior occurred prior
to the Katz decision. The Court's rationale was that the Katz rul-
ing conceivably could deter only subsequent searches, thus justify-
ing exclusion only in such later situations. Justice Harlan dissented
and insisted that Katz should apply to all cases not yet final re-
gardless of the date of police misconduct. "If a 'new' constitutional
doctrine is truly right," he asserted
we should not reverse lower courts which have accepted it; nor should we
affirm those which have rejected the very arguments we have embraced. Any-
thing else would belie the truism that it is the task of this Court, like that of
any other, to do justice to each litigant on the merits of his own case. It is
only if our decisions can be justified in terms of this fundamental premise
that they may properly be considered the legitimate products of a court of
law rather than the commands of a super-legislature.23 8
Although Justice Harlan was unable to convince a majority of
the Court at the time, the Court belatedly accepted his dissent in
the 1982 decision of United States v. Johnson.3 9 In Johnson the
Court applied the newly recognized standard of Payton v. New
York,24° which required police to obtain an arrest warrant before
entering a suspect's home to make a routine felony arrest, to all
cases pending on direct appeal at the time the Court decided Pay-
ton regardless of the date of police misconduct. Relying heavily on
234. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969) (fourth amendment
rights are personal rights); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949) (fourth amendment
expresses a fundamental liberty of individuals binding upon the state through the operation
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment).
235. See L. FULLER, THE MoRALrrY oF LAW 33-41 (1964).
236. 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
237. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
238. 394 U.S. at 259 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
239. 457 U.S. 537 (1982).
240. 435 U.S. 573 (1980).
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Justice Harlan's dissent in Desist, the Court in Johnson recognized
the importance of the Court's behaving in a manner giving
credence to itself and support to constitutional rights whose scope
and violation the Court had acknowledged."4 1 The inconsistent ju-
dicial reactions to violated fundamental rights generated by the
good faith exception jeopardizes the same interests the Court in-
tended Johnson to protect.
Conditioning the evidence's admissibility on an officer's
nonculpable subjective state of mind existing at the time of his
search reveals the second problem posed by the earlier hypothe-
sized situation." Under the good faith exception an officer truly
must believe his conduct was lawful to avoid suppression of the
discovered evidence.24 ' The trial court hearing the suppression mo-
tion, therefore, seemingly must determine the beliefs of the officer
at the time he seized the evidence. If a law enforcement officer's
averment of good faith seems reasonable, however, defense counsel
will find the claim nearly impossible to refute.4 Consequently,
hearings to ascertain the subjective intent and actual knowledge of
the officer will be open invitations to perjury.2 "4 The officer's ad-
justment of the facts in order to obtain conviction of a defendant
he truly believes guilty is understandable given his engagement "in
241. If the fourth amendment protected citizens from only malevolent governmental
intrusions upon privacy then only one of the two earlier hypothesized defendants, see supra
text accompanying notes 230-33, would have a justified claim of right violation. Remedy in
only that one case then would be proper. But motive is not relevant to the issue of whether
police have infringed a citizen's fourth amendment rights. As suggested by Justice Mar-
shall's dissent in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), a focus on a tainted motive, while
possibly justified when dealing with suspect classification and societal gratuities, is concep-
tually irrelevant when the issue concerns fundamental rights. See id. at 113-16 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Although closing a public swimming pool may be unlawful only if done with
racial discriminatory intent, a ban on leafletting would be equally invalid under the first
amendment whether desires to prevent littering or to suppress speech motivated the ban.
See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
242. See supra text accompanying notes 230-33.
243. If the officer had any doubt, the exclusionary rule's deterrent potential would
justify the rule's application.
244. See, e.g., Foote, supra note 132; Theis, "Good Faith" as a Defense to Suits for
Police Deprivations of Individual Rights, 59 MINN. L. REV. 991 (1975).
245. Former Judge Irving Younger, a one-time federal prosecutor, frankly observed
that "[e]very lawyer who practices in the criminal courts knows that police perjury is com-
monplace." Younger, The Perjury Routine, 204 THE NATION 596, 596 (1967). Ironically, op-
ponents of the exclusionary rule generally criticize it for encouraging police distortion of
facts. See Rosenblatt & Rosenblatt, A Legal House of Cards, HARPERs, July 1977, at 18, 20
("While intended to curb abuse of police power, the exclusionary rule has opened up a
whole new field of police misconduct: perjury."). See also Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1032.
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the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. 2 46 Police
likely view allowing a criminal to escape "justice" as a much
greater societal danger than a simple reconstruction of facts at a
suppression hearing.2 47 While the possibility of perjury exists
under the exclusionary rule, perjury is even easier under the sub-
jective component of the good faith exception. Consequently,
rather than alleviating this exclusionary rule weakness, the pro-
posed exception exacerbates it. The exception, thus, merely adds
another layer of potential police perjury to the suppression hear-
ing: a layer most difficult to counteract because only the officer
knows with certainty his subjective intent.
A presumption that all officers intentionally will commit per-
jury is not necessary, however, before the exception's critics can
show that its subjective component is impractical. People selec-
tively perceive, interpret, and recall their sensory impulses based
upon their interests and experiences.2 48 They seldom want to hear,
see, or remember that which is contrary to their needs. Further-
more, ideas, opinions, and positions that coincide with an individ-
ual's own interests or that appeal to his half-submerged prejudices
are difficult for him to reject as untrue.24 19 Given the strength of an
officer's identification with the interests and needs of the police
subculture, if a particular subjective belief is necessary to allow use
of the fruits of a search in a criminal trial, an officer will not have
difficulty convincing himself of its existence.5 ° Whenever a good
faith error reasonably explains police misconduct, an officer will
seldom engage in such misconduct without simultaneously exper-
iencing a strong, even if erroneous, belief in the lawfulness of his
behavior.5 1 Consequently, the good faith exception compounds the
overt problem of perjury with the covert problem of selective
perception.
The Supreme Court is not oblivious to the dangers of having
fourth amendment exclusionary issues revolve around the subjec-
tive belief or intent of individual officers. As recently as 1978, when
the Court was evaluating police conduct relating to wiretaps, it
246. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
247. See J. SKOLNICK, supra note 61, at 215; LaFave, supra note 152, at 154; Younger,
supra note 245, at 596.
248. See Baker, Scope of the First Amendmeht Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 964, 974 (1978).
249. Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1130 (1979).
250. See LaFave, supra note 152, at 154.
251. Cf. Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 437.
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stated that the judiciary should use a "standard of objective rea-
sonableness without regard to the underlying intent or motivation
of the officers involved. 2 52 Furthermore, ten years earlier, three
Justices expressed their uneasiness with courts even attempting to
determine police subjective intent and vehemently asserted that
"sending state and federal courts on an expedition into the minds
of police officers would produce a grave and fruitless misallocation
of judicial resources." 53 If most courts feel the same queasiness
regarding the propriety of judicial determinations of subjective in-
tent,254 judicial review of the subjective component of a claimed
good faith error will be perfunctory at best.
Courts may avoid the aforementioned pitfalls of the good faith
exception's subjective component if they exclusively stress the ex-
ception's objective component. If courts emphasize the exception's
objective aspect, then the police behavior would be in good faith
whenever it is consistent with a reasonable interpretation of prior
doctrine. The officer's subjective intent or belief, therefore, be-
comes irrelevant. Such a purely objective good faith standard, how-
ever, also encourages police trickery and system manipulation. For
example, if an officer doubts whether he has sufficient evidence to
obtain a search warrant, he may proceed without the warrant in
the hope that a trial judge will find his misbehavior reasonable in
an effort to admit incriminating evidence.
Most unfortunately, whenever the law in an area is unsettled,
an objective good faith standard will provide the incentive for of-
ficers to choose the perspective that most jeopardizes fourth
amendment rights. 55 Police would not protect individual privacy
252. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978).
253. Ironically, Justice White, presently the Court's strongest spokesman for a good
faith exception, authored this assertion that an effort to determine police subjective intent
would misallocate judicial resources. Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 565 (1968)
(White, J., joined by Harlan and Stewart, J.J.) (dissenting from a dismissal of certiorari as
improvidently granted).
254. Similar concerns over judicial determinations of subjective beliefs have led crimi-
nal courts frequently to reject mistake of law as a defense to criminal prosecution. Professor
Lon Fuller discussed the danger of recognizing such a defense:
The required intent is so little susceptible of definite proof or disproof that the trier of
fact is almost inevitably driven to asking, "Does he look like the kind who would stick
by the rules or one who would cheat on them when he saw a chance?" This question,
unfortunately, leads easily into another, "Does he look like my kind?"
L. FULLER, supra note 235, at 72-73. Courts may ask the same questions in suppression
hearings with answers biased by the judges' affinity for the police officer's goal of crime
control. See infra text accompanying notes 267-70.
255. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 559 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
LaFave, supra note 3, at 352. Under a good faith exception, the system will encourage foot-
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beyond the standards clearly mandated by case law because such
protection would seem unwarranted and inconsistent with law en-
forcement goals.258 Consequently, judicially articulated constitu-
tional minimums likely would become departmental maximums. A
legal system and police culture that encouraged behavior directed
predominantly toward crime fighting probably would influence
even those officers who otherwise would not consciously decide to
avoid doing more than they legally must.257 In contrast to the good
faith exception, the exclusionary rule at least tempers the law en-
forcement system's tendency to discourage concern over fourth
amendment rights by encouraging the police to err on the side of
greater protection when the law is ambiguous. 58 Precisely in such
cases individuals most need the exclusionary rule.
Consequently, although the subjective component of the good
faith exception is fraught with difficulties, under a purely objective
standard every legal ambiguity or uncertainty constitutes an ave-
nue for system manipulation and subterfuge by police. Consider,
for example, the circumstances in Brewer v. Williams.259 Police
were to transport defendant Williams to Des Moines, Iowa after
dragging as officials will have little incentive, in close cases, to err on the side of respect for
constitutional liberties. See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 561 (1982).
The Court in Johnson rejected the government argument that courts never should ap-
ply decisions resolving unsettled fourth amendment questions to cases that involve police
conduct which preceded the definitive decision. The Court's concerns, expressed in its deci-
sion, are also relevant to the effects of an objectively determined good faith exception: "Offi-
cial awareness of the dubious constitutionality of a practice would be counterbalanced by
official certainty that, so long as the Fourth Amendment law in the area remained unsettled,
evidence obtained through the questionable practice would be [admissible until the render-
ing of an opinion] definitively resolving the unsettled question." Id. See Desist v. United
States, 394 U.S. 244, 273 (1969) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
256. The exclusionary rule's existence provides an officer who believes present doc-
trine insufficiently protects fourth amendment rights with an opportunity to behave in ac-
cordance with his beliefs while justifying his greater concern to fellow officers in crime fight-
ing terms. His behavior merely ensures that a future fickle court ruling will not reject his
arrests or searches. If the court recognizes the good faith exception, however, such an officer
no longer will be able to support fourth amendment interests in terms his colleagues will
accept. Consequently, the proposed exception to the exclusionary rule not only creates an
incentive to foot-drag and to interpret ambiguous areas of law so as to infringe upon fourth
amendment rights, but also creates a disincentive to decide to act in a fashion supporting
such rights by removing any and all legal insulation from peer pressure. See Desist v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 276-77 (1969) (Fortes, J., dissenting) (rejecting court decisions
that award "dunce caps" to those officers who try to anticipate future trends in fourth
amendment doctrine).
257. This Article earlier discussed the role of selective perception and interpretation
of sensory data. See supra text accompanying notes 248-51.
258. See LaFave, supra note 3, at 352.
259. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
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his arraignment for murder charges in Davenport. Police assured
defendant's counsel that they would not interrogate defendant
during the trip. Nevertheless the detective traveling with Williams
made a "christian burial speech," suggesting that due to the wors-
ening weather the murder victim would not receive a proper burial
if police could not locate the body quickly. Williams, susceptible to
such religious considerations, directed the police to the body. The
Supreme Court, in a five to four opinion, found that the detectives
had intentionally separated Williams from his attorney for the
purpose of playing on his sensitivities and eliciting incriminating
statements. Such conduct, concluded the Court, violated the defen-
dant's sixth amendment right to counsel, and, thus, the trial court
could not use the defendant's incriminating statements.
Upon retrial, defense counsel argued that the court also should
not admit the evidence relating to the murder victim's body. The
court should suppress such evidence, he insisted, as "fruit of the
poisonous tree" since police discovered the body as the result of
unconstitutional behavior. The state responded that the instituted
police search of the area would have found the body eventually
even without the defendant's assistance and, thus, the court prop-
erly had admitted the evidence under an "inevitable discovery doc-
trine.12 60 The Iowa Supreme Court agreed that such evidence was
admissible but only if the state could prove that (1) the police did
not act in bad faith for the purpose of hastening discovery of the
evidence in question, and (2) that police would have discovered the
evidence by lawful means. 261
For purposes of this Article, the court's evaluation of bad faith
is highly informative. The court held,
While there can be no doubt that the method upon which the police em-
barked in order to gain William's assistance was both subtly coercive and
purposeful, and that its purpose was to discover the victim's body, we cannot
find that it was in bad faith. The issue of the propriety of the police conduct
in this case . . .has caused the closest possible division of views in every
appellate court which has considered the question. In light of the legitimate
disagreement among individuals well versed in the law of criminal procedure
who were given the opportunity for calm deliberation, it cannot be said that
the actions of the police were taken in bad faith.262
The Iowa Court resolved the issue of good faith simply by not-
ing that jurists, even Supreme Court Justices, reasonably had dis-
260. State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 255-56 (Iowa 1979).
261. Id. at 260.
262. Id. at 260-61.
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agreed on the constitutionality of the police behavior.26 s That the
detective clearly tried to manipulate the defendant while out of his
counsel's presence and to trick him into incriminating himself was
of no significance. Although the Williams case does not involve a
fourth amendment issue it reveals the likely outcome if courts em-
phasize the objective component of the good faith exception to
avoid the dangers of the exception's subjective component. Wil-
liams illustrates how the objective component threatens police
abuse. In turn, courts can remove this threat of abuse only by de-
termining police intent and once again evaluating police subjectivi-
ties.28 4 The implementation problems associated with a good faith
exception, thus, are insoluble. Whether the courts focus on the ex-
ception's objective or subjective aspect, implementation of the
good faith exception will result in diminished protection of fourth
amendment rights. The institutional setting in which courts will
determine the existence of good faith exacerbates this danger.
B. Increased Pro-Police Bias of Suppression Hearings
The good faith exception inevitably would convert suppression
hearings into swearing contests. Police would assert that their be-
liefs are honest while the defense would question their integrity.
Trial court judges, thus, would have to make suppression decisions
on the basis of the least reliable or determinative kind of evidence.
Additionally, the need to define a "reasonable" mistake of law
would impose upon suppression judges the responsibility to make
exceedingly difficult determinations on a regular basis. The trial
court, therefore, would have tremendous discretion in ruling
whether or not the police engaged in the objectionable behavior in
263. If a good faith exception extended beyond the fourth amendment to all motions
for evidence suppression, the Iowa court's interpretation of good faith would have ended the
need for the Supreme Court's decision in Brewer in the first place. The incriminating state-
ments, obtained under a "good faith" error, would have been admissible. Additionally, if the
Court decided the issue of good faith first, the Court would not have needed to determine
whether the detective's behavior was proper. Sixth amendment doctrine in this area, conse-
quently, would remain unclear and police could repeat identical mistakes in "good faith."
264. Following a second conviction, Williams sought federal habeus corpus relief.
Judge Arnold of the Eighth Circuit rejected the perspective of the Iowa decision:
The question before us is not whether the Supreme Court's opinion in Brewer v. Wil-
liams is fairly debatable as a legal matter. Obviously it is. The question is rather what
was in [the detective's] mind during [the] ride back to Des Moines. . . . The relevant
question-bad faith-is subjective .. . . [Here the question is whether] the closeness
of a later judicial decision necessarily establish[es] that conduct approved by a minor-
ity of judges is not in bad faith? We think not.
Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164, 1170 (8th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added).
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good faith. Given that the lower judiciary "has hardly been very
trustworthy in this area" of police credibility and misbehavior,"6 5
this basically unfettered discretion likely will result, because of the
fact finding propensities of state trial courts,66 in almost auto-
matic admission of illegally obtained evidence whenever the officer
claims good faith.
Even critics of the exclusionary rule acknowledge the anti-ex-
clusionary rule bias of trial judges. 267 The judges' continuing rela-
tionship with police and prosecutors, their discomfort with refus-
ing to admit relevant and apparently reliable evidence, 68 their
interaction with crime victims, and their susceptibility to commu-
nity pressure to punish the guilty affect their perception leaving
them functionally and psychologically allied with police in the
prosecution of crime.26 9 Since the above factors leave trial courts
reluctant to interfere with police crime fighting efforts, under a
good faith exception such courts likely will be eager to believe of-
ficers claiming an honestly held belief in the lawfulness of the
search or seizure in question.
Decisions that reflect this bias rarely are susceptible to appel-
late review because appellate courts are disinclined to review trial
court findings of fact.27 1 Furthermore, determinations of credibil-
ity, frequently based on factors such as witness appearance or atti-
265. Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1045.
266. Appellate courts arguably have constitutionalized whole areas of criminal proce-
dure precisely because of the trial court's fact finding propensities. For example, Professor
Amsterdam insists that the Supreme Court's fear of the trial court's pro-police bias shaped
the confession cases. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Crimi-
nal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 785, 803-10 (1970). Lower courts consistently had resolved the
"swearing contest" over what took place during police interrogation in favor of the police.
Cf. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1, 7 (1956).
267. E.g., Wilkey, A Call for Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule: Let Congress and
the Trial Courts Speak, 62 JUDICATURE 351, 356 (1979). Some argue that the exclusionary
rule pressures the courts to water down standards for proper searches and arrests in order to
avoid the rule's effect of "freeing obviously guilty defendants." Barrett, Personal Rights,
Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 46, 66. See Ashdown,
supra note 3, at 1294, 1315 (courts now use the privacy concept of Katz, originally meant to
expand the scope of fourth amendment protection, to draw "unrealistic distinctions in favor
of law enforcement"); Schlesinger, supra note 3, at 405.
268. See Schwartz, Stop and Frisk (A Case Study in Judicial Control of the Police),
58 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sc. 433, 448-49 (1967); Wilkey, supra note 267, at
356.
269. Amsterdam, supra note 266, at 792.
270. See Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1038-39.
271. Appellate judges are better able to confront dispassionately fourth amendment




tude which cannot be duplicated in a record for appeal, are virtu-
ally immune from review. Since the good faith exception's
subjective component requires a trial court determination of police
credibility, it gives trial judges, already opposed to the exclusion-
ary rule, a virtually unreviewable means of avoiding the rule's
impact. 27 1
Trial courts' rulings on the objective component of the good
faith exception also are likely to reflect an anti-suppression bias.
The police error is reasonable if the facts and circumstances of the
specific case as found by the trial court reasonably could justify the
police action under the then existing case law. Yet reasonableness,
arguably, has little more usefulness for analytical purposes than
indicating consistency within a given system of values and belief.2 73
Given the role of selective perception and the similarity of police
and trial judge attitudes about criminal law enforcement, judicial
findings of fact that make an officer's error reasonable should not
be surprising. If the error's reasonableness, in the context of the
facts found, is initially for the trial court to determine, in practice
appellate courts will defer to the factual findings of trial courts and
trial courts will defer to the factual testimony of police. 274
Under the good faith exception the traditional pro-police bias
of suppression hearings not only would be insulated from appellate
review, it likely would be aggravated. Under the present exclusion-
ary rule trial judges determine whether an officer's judgment was
wrong in a basically amoral, technical and mechanical sense. The
good faith exception, however, changes the issue from whether an
officer violated a fourth amendment right to whether he deserves
moral reproachment. A court will be far more open to finding an
officer "wrong" than to finding him "bad. '275 Thus, a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule frames the exclusion issue in
terms, and focuses its resolution at judicial levels, least conducive
272. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 3, at 449-50.
273. Weyrauch, Taboo and Magic in Law, 25 STAN. L. REV. 782, 800 (1973).
274. Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 394.
275. Courts and law enforcement agencies much more calmly accepted the Supreme
Court decisions in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (requiring presence of defense
attorney at post-indictment lineup), and Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (re-
quiring presence of defense attorney at post-indictment interrogations of defendant), for
example, than they did Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Wade and Massiah seemed
to revolve around the technical requirement of counsel for all post-indictment evidence pro-
ducing contacts between government and defendant. Miranda, on the other hand, admon-
ished police for trickery, perjury, and actions "destructive of human dignity," 384 U.S. at
457. Miranda was harder to accept precisely because it questioned the professionality and
integrity of the police. For further discussion, see Ingber, supra note 145, at 287-95.
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to the sympathetic development of fourth amendment rights.
C. The Unconvincing Nature of the Strongest Case for a Good
Faith Exception
Considering the good faith exception in its strongest context
illustrates the practical problems of its implementation. Exclusion
of evidence seems least fair when law enforcement officers reasona-
bly have relied on a judicially-issued search or arrest warrant later
found defective for lack of probable cause. When officers have
tested the existence of probable cause by dutifully obtaining a
search warrant from a judge or magistrate, and have executed the
warrant according to its terms, exception proponents point out
that exclusion of evidence can have no conceivable effect upon the
officers' behavior.Y Particularly when the magistrate also made
his determination of probable cause, although erroneous, reasona-
bly and in good faith, little justification seems to exist for exclud-
ing the discovered evidence. Upon closer examination of this con-
text, however, the argument for a good faith exception remains
unconvincing.
The Supreme Court long has manifested a constitutional pref-
erence for arrests2 7 and searches278 made pursuant to a warrant.
The Court has touted the ability of the warrant process to protect
fourth amendment interest because the process ensures that a neu-
tral and detached magistrate 79 makes the probable cause determi-
nation in an informed and deliberative manner.280 Jurists perceive
such a process of "judicial impartiality 281 as clearly preferable to
one in which police or prosecutors, engaged in the competitive en-
terprise of ferreting out crime,2 reach such decisions hurriedly,283
and judicial officers review the decisions only after the fact and by
hindsight judgment.
The actual existence of neutral and detached magistrates mak-
ing impartial deliberative determinations, however, is highly
276. In Gates, in which Justice White made his strongest pro-exception argument, po-
lice officers, arguably, had so obtained and executed a search warrant. Illinois v. Gates, 103
S. Ct. 2317, 2344-47 (1983).
277. See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 93-96 (1964).
278. See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106-07 (1965).
279. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
280. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110 (1964) (quoting United States v. Lefkowitz,
285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932)).
281. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
282. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
283. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110 (1964).
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doubtful. In most states the public elects magistrates to office. 284
Thus, the magistrates are susceptible to public pressure to more
effectively fight crime.28 5 In many states magistrates need not be,
and many rural magistrates are not, lawyers.288 Such lay magis-
trates often rely on the advice of the legally educated prosecutor in
determining whether to issue a warrant.
Urban magistrates, on the other hand, usually are trained law-
yers and, thus, seemingly could avoid dependency on prosecutorial
advice. They, however, have such extensive caseloads 28 7 that nor-
mally they have little time to adequately review a warrant applica-
tion. Consequently, such overworked urban magistrates, as their
rural counterparts, often give warrants perfunctorily relying on the
judgment of police and prosecutors to evaluate the need and pro-
priety of the request.2"8
When a magistrate's psychological and perceptual allegiance
to police crime fighting goals 2 9 couples with his susceptibility to
public pressure and his reliance on police and prosecutor probable
cause evaluations, his neutrality and detachment in issuing war-
284. Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 179, at 8.
285. In other states governors or local governmental officials appoint magistrates for a
fixed term of office. Id. Political considerations make it unlikely that those seen as "easy on
crime" will receive appointments.
286. Id. See also Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972) (upholding the con-
stitutionality of lay magistrates). Federal magistrates, on the other hand, must be attorneys.
Some federal magistrates, however, serve only part time while also practicing law. If a fed-
eral magistrate seeks clients in the community where he presides he may feel pressured to
portray an image of an official protecting the community from crime rather than one overly
sensitive to fourth amendment interests.
287. The responsibilities of these urban judges often include presiding over misde-
meanor trials, minor civil cases, and preliminary felony proceedings. In a busy urban court
the caseload per judge can reach 2000 per year. Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, & J. ISRAEL, supra
note 179, at 9. The result is often "assembly line justice." "With their crowded facilities,
lack of adequate staffing and routinized procedure, these magistrate courts create an atmo-
sphere . . . that is more appropriate for a supermarket than a court of justice." Id.
288. "How can a magistrate be more than a 'rubber stamp' in signing warrants," ques-
tioned Professor Barrett,
unless he devotes at least some minutes in each case to reading the affidavits submitted
to him in support of the request for a warrant, and inquiring into the background of
the conclusions stated therein? And where is the judicial time going to be found to
make such inquiries in the generality of cases? The Los Angeles Municipal Court with
annual filings of about 130,000 (excluding parking and traffic) finds itself so pressed
that in large areas of its caseload it averages but a minute per case in receiving pleas
and imposing sentence: How could it cope with the added burden that would be in-
volved in the issuance of warrants to govern the approximately 200,000 arrests [much
less searches] made per year in Los Angeles for offenses other than traffic?
Barrett, Criminal Justice: The Problem of Mass Production, in THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC,
AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 85, 117-18 (H.W. Jones ed. 1965).
289. See Amsterdam, supra note 266, at 792.
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rants are highly questionable. Magistrates with needs and interests
similar to law enforcement agents likely will perceive as reasonable
those steps that such agents perceive as reasonable.2 °0 Not surpris-
ingly, therefore, in the context of an ex parte review of a warrant
application, magistrates rarely fail to find probable cause to issue
the warrant. 1
Even if a magistrate is doubtful whether probable cause exists,
his reliance on police and prosecutor evaluations and his belief
that defense counsel adequately can test the validity of his proba-
ble cause determination by a motion to suppress, make it likely
that he will err on the side of greater rather than lesser police au-
thority. Yet, once police obtain a warrant they tend to be less cau-
tious. Furthermore, courts direct suppression hearing judges,
whom magistrates rely upon to correct magistrate error, to defer to
a magistrate's probable cause determination whenever possible.
2 92
Additionally, appellate judges are reluctant to overrule two prior
judicial determinations. 29 3 Responsibility for neutral and detached
probable cause determinations, thus, passes from hand to hand.
The warrant process, therefore, ultimately relies on the initial
290. See supra text accompanying notes 248-51.
291. Scholars widely have recognized the pervasive tendency for magistrates to grant
warrant applications without adequate independent evaluation. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra
note 3, at 471-72 n.532; see also W. LAFAvE, ARREsT-THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT
INTO CUSTODY 30-36 (1965); T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 48
(1969); LaFave and Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making and
Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. REv. 987, 991-95 (1965). In Lo-Ji Sales,
Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979), the Supreme Court castigated a magistrate for be-
coming a member of the police search party. While few magistrates would cooperate with
police quite as overtly as the magistrate did in Lo-Ji Sales, institutional comraderie may
function covertly, but effectively, in merging the interest of police, prosecutor, and
magistrate.
The problems associated with warrant grants do not suggest that warrants are of no
value whatsoever. The pre-search affidavit in support of a warrant application ordinarily
deprives the officer of the benefit of hindsight coloring the reasonableness of the search and
seizure after it has produced evidence in support of itself. See United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798, 828-29 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also W. LAFAvE, supra at 296-97; J.
SKOLNICK, supra note 61, at 214-15.
292. "[T]he duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a
'substantial basis for. . . conclud[ing]' that probable cause existed." Illinois v. Gates, 103 S.
Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983).
293. A 1981 review of then recent decisions from the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, for
example, found no decision holding a warrant insufficient. Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra
note 3, at 456. Judicial questioning of magistrate judgments is much more difficult than
questioning police judgments. Magistrates are, of course, members of the same "trade
union" as are judges. Judges are unlikely to question one of their own since they themselves
are adverse to superior courts' questioning and overruling them.
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probable cause determinations of police and prosecutors: the very
judgments the legal system's architects designed the process to
oversee.
29 4
This practical rather than mythical perception of the warrant
process belies its neutrality and detachment. Recognition of a good
faith exception in this context merely would compound the prob-
lem. Under the exception whenever "well trained" officers and
magistrates reasonably could differ on whether probable cause ex-
ists, evidence seized under the defective warrant remains admissi-
ble." 5 Well trained officers, however, also are aware that a substan-
tial disparity exists among magistrates as to the extent of evidence
necessary before any given magistrate will issue a warrant."9 Thus,
the good faith exception encourages an officer or prosecutor unsure
whether probable cause for an arrest or search exists to "shop
around" for a lenient magistrate likely to err only in the direction
of effective law enforcement.2 7
Magistrate shopping, however, met with overt judicial disap-
proval in United States v. Davis.29 8 In Davis, a Treasury agent and
an assistant U.S. attorney requested a federal magistrate to issue a
warrant on the basis of an affidavit. The magistrate denied this
request. The following day the same agent and assistant attorney
presented the same affidavit to a second magistrate who issued the
warrant. The federal district court found such magistrate shopping
highly improper and concluded that the first magistrate's decision
was binding and prevented a second magistrate from issuing a war-
rant on the exact same showing.29 e A good faith exception covertly
will encourage the magistrate shopping Davis overtly condemns. If
the Court recognizes the exception, it merely will lead officers and
prosecutors to approach initially those magistrates reputed to be
more sympathetic to their needs, as was the second magistrate in
Davis.3 00 Law enforcement officers in the jurisdiction need never
repeat the agent's error in Davis; they merely can bypass the first
294. See Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 394.
295. See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2346 (White, J., concurring).
296. L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 204 (1967).
297. See id. at 120.
298. 346 F. Supp. 435 (S.D. Ill. 1972).
299. Id. at 442.
300. The good faith exception, thus, compounds the magistrate-shopping problem. At
least in a Davis-type situation the second magistrate is aware of the proceeding before the
first magistrate and, thus, likely will act cautiously. Under a good faith exception, however,
if police or prosecutors merely choose strategically the first magistrate, that magistrate may
remain unaware of the uncertainty of probable cause in the case at hand.
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magistrate on questionable cases.
Ironically, although the defective warrant allegedly provides
the strongest justification for a good faith exception, the exception
is least necessary in this setting. Fourth amendment substantive
law already recognizes that in doubtful or marginal cases a court
should sustain a search with warrant when it would not without
one.301 Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Gates insisted that re-
viewing courts merely should ensure that there was a" 'substantial
basis for. . . conclud[ing] that probable cause existed.' "302 Courts,
therefore, already are to disregard any reasonable deviation by a
magistrate from some hypothetically knowable probable cause
standard and sustain the resulting search and seizure as constitu-
tional.30 3 To recognize additionally a good faith exception when a
magistrate grants a warrant under circumstances in which even
this strong judicial preference is insufficient to sustain it, is to con-
done and encourage a magistrate's gross insensitivity to fourth
amendment values.3 0 4 Thus, even in the context its supporters
most frequently use to justify a good faith exception, the exception
again merely is a covert attack upon fourth amendment principles.
V. CONCLUSION: LEGITIMACY AND THE ROLE OF THE COURT
Judicial recognition of a good faith exception to the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule would be more than a simple refine-
301. "[I]n a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable
where without one it would fall." United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965).
302. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983) (quoting Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257, 271 (1960)). "[W]e have repeatedly said that after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of
the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review. A magistrate's
'determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.'" Id.
at 2331 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969)).
303. Gates itself, consequently, may encourage magistrate shopping.
304. Some jurists have questioned whether exclusion ever is a proper remedy when a
judge or magistrate rather than a police officer committed the constitutional error. See, e.g.,
Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2345 (1983) (White, J., concurring); Commonwealth v.
Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, , 441 N.E.2d 725, 735 (1982). Yet, the system expects magis-
trates, even more than police, to understand court decisions and follow their directives. See
Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 563 (1979). Although the deterrent value of exclusion upon
police confronted with hurried and situational choices may be questionable, see supra text
accompanying notes 73-86, the potential effect upon magistrates, many of whom are trained
in the law, is less open to doubt. The more direct effect of exclusion upon magistrates sug-
gests they are more susceptible to the educational force of judicial actions under the exclu-
sionary rule than are law enforcement agents. Without the possibility of exclusion in close
cases, courts never may have the opportunity to identify a magistrate's error and articulate
directives for magistrates to follow in future similar situations. Motions to exclude, thus, are
more vital when the error is the magistrate's rather than the police officer's.
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ment of remedy. The exception would serve as a well camouflaged
and subtle attack upon the values and substantive meaning of the
amendment itself. Courts rarely would articulate new search and
seizure standards sensitive to fourth amendment interests because
once a court found police good faith the constitutional determina-
tion would be irrelevant to the outcome of those very cases in
which such articulation might take place.305 Insulated from the
continuing pressure to decide new fourth amendment issues or
dramatically review old ones, courts will lose the opportunity or
incentive to set standards for future cases. Consequently, the disin-
centive to review new fourth amendment issues will reduce signifi-
cantly the exclusionary rule's ability to generally and systemically
deter illegal police behavior. Furthermore, the good faith exception
greatly will dilute existing substantive fourth amendment protec-
tions, such as probable cause, that already factor in the possibility
of reasonable error, and, thus, will leave the individual significantly
more vulnerable to governmental intrusion. In addition to this
clear, but often unrevealed, substantive effect upon the fourth
amendment, the exception has the procedural ramification of sub-
stituting the trial for the appellate court as the critical institution
for exclusion decisions. The good faith exception's focus on officer
credibility combined with trial court's notorious pro-police bias
likely would lead consistently to decisions sacrificing fourth
amendment interests.
Of more subtle, but greater, significance than these erosions of
the fourth amendment, would be the denigration of constitutional
rights generally arising from a system that responds with indiffer-
ence to violations of these rights.0 If constitutional rights were to
lose their transcendental aura and the citizenry were to view them
as deserving protection only when convenient or socially advanta-
geous, the importance of a written bill of rights in an otherwise
democratic society would be subject to grave doubts. The actual
existence of the American Bill of Rights sufficiently sanctifies the
right of privacy in this culture to justify a different approach for
305. As argued earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 226-28, this also may serve
to inhibit a creative attorney's ability to defend his client. The good faith exception, thus,
also may run afoul of the sixth amendment's right to counsel.
306. A legal system that treats the violation of one constitutional right with indiffer-
ence may find it increasingly acceptable to treat the violation of other rights similarly. The
fourth amendment is not the only constitutional right subject to the criticism of being ex-
cessively costly. Consequently, adopting a cost-benefit analytical mode for fourth amend-
ment issues may lead to the use of such analysis to lessen the significance of other constitu-
tional rights as well.
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controlling law enforcement than that used by other nations."0
The above factors should be the Supreme Court's foremost
concerns in evaluating the good faith exception during its October
1983 term.0 Yet, the Court has indicated its sensitivity to and
307. Whether the nations with which the United States is compared, see supra note 50
and accompanying text, have symbolic counterparts to the fourth amendment is unclear.
Additionally, the exclusionary rule may be a valid response to a unique American experi-
ence. This country is more ethnically and racially heterogenious than others. It also has a
greater tradition of lawlessness, by citizen and official alike, and a more moralistic system of
criminal law, which specifically pressures officials to disregard the privacy of citizens.
Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1031. As suggested by Professor Phillip Johnson: "We can no more
[expect to] import our solutions than we can export our problems." Johnson, Book Review,
87 YALE L.J. 406, 414 (1977).
308. Evaluation of the three cases originally scheduled for Supreme Court argument,
see supra note 19 and accompanying text, is now appropriate:
(1) Colorado v. Quintero, -Colo. - , 657 P.2d 948, cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3535
(1983), poses the issue whether a court should exclude evidence obtained by a good faith
seizure of stolen property. If the seizure was reasonable in light of the officer's knowledge at
the time, the seizure is based on probable cause and, thus, is constitutional. Consequently,
for good faith even to be an issue in this appeal by the state prosecutor, the state courts
must have found the seizure unreasonable. To allow a good faith exception in this context
would constitute either a surreptitious attack upon and dilution of the reasonable ground/
probable cause standard applied by the state court, see supra text accompanying notes 154-
62, or an acceptance of a totally subjective belief standard of good faith. This Article already
has described the dangers of such a subjective belief standard. See supra text accompanying
note 234-54. Although the Court recently dismissed the writ of certiorari in this case, see
supra note 19, if a similar situation presents itself in the future, the Court should reject
both of these alternatives.
(2) United States v. Leon, No. 82-1093 (9th Cir. Jan. 19, 1983), cert, granted, 103 S. Ct.
3535 (1983), asks whether a court should exclude evidence seized in reasonable, good faith
reliance on a search warrant subsequently held defective due to inadequate probable cause
for its issuance. Not to exclude such evidence blatantly will encourage magistrate shopping
with police and prosecutors presenting their warrant applications to magistrates reputed to
be lenient or willing to rubber stamp warrant requests. See supra text accompanying notes
295-300. In addition, the presumptive constitutionality of searches and seizures executed
under warrant already mandates courts to disregard possible marginal errors by a magis-
trate. See supra text accompanying notes 301-04. This presumption once compounded by a
good faith exception again would dilute fourth amendment protections.
(3) Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d 725 (1982), cert. granted
sub nom. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 103 S. Ct. 3534 (1983), also pertains to seizure of
evidence by police relying in good faith upon a warrant. But in this case the warrant is
defective due to a magistrate error in failing to specify in the warrant itself items police
were to seize. The police search, however, was no more extensive or detailed than a magis-
trate could have authorized under a properly drawn warrant. This case, therefore, is more
equivocal.
The state supreme court held that the failure to describe the items police were to seize
was a "serious omission of constitutional significance." 387 Mass. at -, 441 N.E.2d at
733-34 n.17. The motion judge, in fact, had viewed the warrant as a "'general warrant' akin
to the colonial 'writ of assistance' which led to the enactment of. . . the Fourth Amend-
ment." Id. at 738 (Liacos, J., concurring). Although in the specific case the searching officer
also was the affiant and, therefore, knew what items the warrant meant to allow police to
retrieve, such is not always the case. Required itemization, thus, normally serves both to
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empathy with the public's dissatisfaction with the seemingly high
cost of the exclusionary rule.0 9 Concerns about its own legitimacy
and that of the criminal justice system generally, likely will tempt
the Court to recognize a good faith exception. Recognition of the
exception, however, would not be the preferable response of the
Court to the public outcry. The Court should acknowledge that the
substance of fourth amendment standards rather than the exclu-
sionary rule causes the alleged interference with police effective-
ness. Perhaps as society becomes more complex and individuals
and institutions become more interdependent, society must reduce
privacy interests to assure sufficient public safety.3 10 This nation
actually may be so fearful of crime that its citizens are willing to
compromise the sanctity of constitutional liberties. The rhetoric of
remedy, however, should not mask the decision to make such a
compromise. 1 A frontal attack upon the fourth amendment at
least would constitute a forthright admission that at issue is the
extent to which the society is willing to protect individuals from
governmental intrusion.3 1 2 The public and the Court must recog-
nize overtly the values at stake in order to assure that the ensuing
decisions reflects an accurate and preferred value choice.
Further, the proposition that the Court would enhance its role
give notice to an officer of the limits of his authority as well as to inform the party searched
of the extent to which the law obliges him to defer to the officer's demands. Without these
two ramifications, the warrant process is of little significance. Consequently, excluding such
evidence fulfills general and systemic deterrence interests as well as vindication of a consti-
tutional right.
Furthermore, in Sheppard, the magistrate's actions were not reasonable; they clearly
were negligent. As Justice Liacos asserted in his separate concurrence: "The magistrate who
utterly fails to describe the things to be seized under the search warrant has not made a
reasonable effort to comply with the law." Id. Even if a good faith error is arguably appro-
priate when the exclusion of evidence is unlikely to have a deterrent effect on an innocent
official, Sheppard is obviously not such a case.
309. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
310. This author remains unconvinced by this allegation.
311. Legal institutions often have masked value choices through use of procedure, cer-
emony, or rhetoric. See J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW (1976); Ingber, supra
note 57, at 332-38; Weyrauch, Law as Mask-Legal Ritual and Relevance, 66 CALIF. L. REv.
699 (1978). While this device may avoid societal strife due to ideological conflict, see Ingber,
supra note 145, at 266-73, it also relieves from both institutions and individuals the need to
accept responsibility for the value choices in fact made. Ingber, supra note 57, at 325-29.
312. Some authors bemoan that the exclusionary rule has led to the narrowing of the
fourth amendment's scope. See supra note 267. They suggest that abolishing or modifying
the rule may lead to greater acceptance of a privacy right. Assuming they are correct, one
must question the significance of a right accepted as an abstraction, but which upon viola-
tion results in no meaningful vindication of its claim. Narrowing of articulated constitu-
tional protections in fact may be the only honest response to an unwillingness to continue to
accept the costs that society must pay for meaningful individual liberties.
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in our constitutional system by deferring to the public outcry itself
is doubtful. All individual rights when placed into context are
laden with societal cost and possible popular disapproval.313 The
heterogeneity of American society and the often irreconcilable ten-
sions between honored values make unanimous approval of any de-
cision impossible. Every decision, by necessity, will result in dissat-
isfaction by some. Consequently, no decisional institution can
afford to concern itself only with increasing its popularity. The le-
gitimacy that allows judicial institutions to be effective is signifi-
cant only if, at appropriate times, those institutions use the law to
educate and direct society rather than conform to and follow it. A
court enforcing individual liberties must contribute something be-
yond what a system of popular fiat could accomplish. 14
A significant portion of the Supreme Court's legitimacy comes
from fulfilling its role as protector of constitutional liberties.
Whether situationally comfortable or not, the Court has played a
role of moral leadership in our constitutional system.3 15 The
Court's adoption of a good faith exception because of public dis-
pleasure with the costs of fourth amendment rights would consti-
tute an abdication of its leadership responsibilities. Such an abdi-
cation, in turn, would diminish the Court's importance and
prestige.
Admittedly, the Court can lead society only if society is willing
to follow. If, in order to protect individual liberties, the Court too
frequently or too severely interferes with broad societal goals, pub-
lic opinion may threaten substantially its legitimacy. But institu-
tions such as the Court have the luxury of time at their disposal:
they can lead gradually. Language and rhetoric are tools that the
Court can use to slowly alter public perceptions in order to intro-
duce new or protect old values. As Professor Anthony Amsterdam
eloquently observed:
313. See supra text accompanying notes 100-02.
314. Many significant constitutional cases also are those that critics attacked most
stridently. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 195-98 (1962) (criticizing
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)); H. WECHSLER, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitu-
tional Law, in PRINCIPLES, POLITICS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 36-48 (1961) (criticizing Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 438 (1954)); Baldwin & Nagan, Board of Regents v. Bakke: The
All-American Dilemma Revisited, 30 U. FLA. L. REv. 843 (1978) (criticizing Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment
on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973) (criticizing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). Of
course, at those times when law educates and leads society, it is most open to the accusation
of elitism.
315. M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 99 (1982).
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Like the Pythias cries, [Supreme Court decisions respecting suspects' and de-
fendants' rights] have vast mystical significance. They state our aspirations.
They give a few good priests something to work with. They give some of the
faithful the courage to carry on and reasons to improve the priesthood in-
stead of tearing down the temple."'
Fourth amendment exclusionary cases may only "state our aspira-
tions," aspirations frequently unfulfilled or unfulfillable in prac-
tice. But without such aspirations no transcendental importance to
individual rights exists and their recognition slowly may decay into
a matter of popular or official appreciation: a matter of costs and
benefits.
Observers expect the Supreme Court's responses to the good
faith proposal this term.117 Hopefully, the Court will address the
arguments presented in this Article and reject the exception. If
not, virtually every state supreme court may refight the battle as
defendants' attorneys ask them to interpret their state constitu-
tions' search and seizure provisions. The citadel may yet be saved.
316. Amsterdam, supra note 266, at 793.
317. 52 U.S.L.W. 3201 (Sept. 27, 1983); see supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
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